Question Submission 1

As mentioned in the 'Explanation and Evolution Among the Greeks' handout (p. 2), Aristotle believed that a binary branching tree of species could be established using the concepts of 'essential' (defining) and 'accidental' (other) traits of a particular organsism. Characteristics that an organism shares with related species would be considered 'accidental', whereas a particular trait that makes that organsism unique compared to other organisms would be considered 'essential'. Does the idea of 'convergent evolution' (the acquisition of the same trait in unrelated lineages; such as the development of the wing in various animals) interfere with Aristotle's classification system? (i.e. would different animals possessing similar 'essential' qualities due to convergent evolution water down the quality of Aristotle's classification system?) Additionally, would the concept of convergent evolution be of value to a natural theologian, particularly one who was interested in investigating the functional designs in nature? (see 'The Image of Perfection and its Demise' handout p. 1 part 1.3)

Darwin gives little implication, at least in the first four chapters, that man is also a product of natural selection and was born of lesser creatures. There seems to be a separation of man from all other life. Being a naturalist surely Darwin saw similarities between humans and other mammals, and of inherited traits being passed from generation to generation in man. Darwin’s religious beliefs seem disputed, so the question is; Was Darwin influenced by religion to believe man was not a product of evolution? Or was he simply afraid of putting such a radical hypothesis into the scientific community? Perhaps he wished to put forth first the theory without highlighting its implications for humans, to “ease” the idea of evolution into the public before dropping the bomb of human from lesser mammals concept. Is this the case?

Jumping ahead to the Darwin here, but I'm relying on the fact that the first four chapters contain more than enough to sustain two weeks worth of questions...

In Chapter III (Paragraph 10) Darwin offers an analogy that I find at the same time vivid and obscure. He says: “The face of Nature may be compared to a yielding surface, with ten thousand sharp wedges packed close together and driven inwards by incessant blows, sometimes on wedge being struck, and then another with greater force.” He submits this analogy in the context of his description of the constant struggle inherent in nature. What I'd like to ask is, first, how do others understand this analogy? I can't quite get a handle on what particular piece of his argument it is supposed to illustrate. Beyond that, however, it also makes me wonder about the role of analogy in Darwin's argument. Does he employ such examples as more than simple rhetorical tools? What, if any, explanatory role do they play in Origin?

In various sections of the first four chapters of On the Origin of Species, Charles Darwin attributes general biological characteristics to species and populations of organisms. For example on pg. 102, Darwin claims, “A large amount of inheritable and diversified variability is favourable, but I believe mere individual differences suffice for the work [of natural selection].” In this case, a group or population has the characteristic of “diversified variability” which is favorable for natural selection among individuals. But, he does not say anymore about the possibility of species or group level selection, given this species/group level characteristic. Additionally, when discussing the divergence of characters on pg. 117, Darwin reiterates that large, common and geographically widely diffused species have more variation within their populations than do smaller, less common and less diffused species. Darwin goes on to say that the larger species will tend to speciate more than the smaller species. Darwin considers this a condition favorable for natural selection at the individual level, and rightly so. But, why doesn’t Darwin continue these arguments to the species level, especially when considering speciation itself? In fact, is his argument for the wide diffusion of one species over others in a genus a species level selection argument? Practically speaking, is his refusal to consider species level selection a result of his (and others) difficulty in defining the differences between species, sub-species and varieties?

HI, I think you make a very important point. Darwin makes only one reference to mankind in the Origin of Species in the concluding chapter. His comment is "Light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history". It seems to me that this was partly due to caution and the fact that this would have made the book more unpalatable. However it is clear from the M & N notebooks that Darwin had already "adopted a materialist perspective, at least on how his theory would apply to humankind" (Bowler, Evolution, 2001 pg 163).

We must also keep in mind that the discussion of man's origins would require a long sustained argument. Hence, I would suggest although I am not sure how many historians would agree with me, that the omission from people in the Origin of species is partly due to the fact that Darwin was pushed to publish the Origin upon receiving news that Alfred R. Wallace was developing a similar theory. Darwin had intended to write a much longer book. Thus, due to time and in order to separate the discussion between evolution and the evolution of man (a topic which he saved for his Descent of Man). Apropos the mind and morality Darwin argued that this were evolved - a difference in degree and not in kind.

This is by no means exhaustive but I thought I'd give it a try.

I think the genealogy of Darwin's thought is an important aspect to explore. How did Darwin came up with natural selection and what role did different thinkers have on him. One particular point is whether he first thought of artificial selection and then realised that a similar principle could be in effect in nature or whether the analogy occurred to him after the fact. Darwin claims in his autobiography that the former is the case. In a sense, the Origin is supposed to take readers on a path akin to Darwin's own. However, several scholars (Bowler, Evolution, 1983; Largent, 2009) have cast doubt on this alleged sequence of events. Further, the analogy between natural and artificial selection may be problematic. Artificial selection is both teleological and, at the time, restrictive. Natural selection violates both of these principles. Artificial selection is teleological because there is a breeder with a specific goal in mind who consciously chooses which organisms to breed together in order to bring about the desired and planned change. Secondly, artificial selection does not provide evidence for the transmutation of species rather it supports and expands the degree of variation within a species. F. Jenkins published an anonymous review in the Edinborough review in 1867 which had four criticisms of Darwinian evolution; amongst this was the fact that even if breeders and/or nature can select for varieties there is no reason to suppose that the degree of variation is limitless. A good way to think about this critique and problem with artificial selection is to think of the average organisms as the centre of a balloon - each variation exists in space within the volume of the balloon. The balloon has an outer boundary which cannot be crossed. The problem with the analogy between artificial and natural selection is that, in order, for new species to be created Darwin not only had to show that variation existed, and that breeders were able to choose and even push the extend to which these variations existed in nature but that selection could surpass the boundary between species. I wonder whether these shortcomings were discussed and to what extend they influenced the reception of Darwinian evolution.

In dealing with a wide range of unexplainable phenomena and little knowledge about the mechanisms of heredity Darwin's created a proto-genetic agent called the gemmule in his theory of pangenesis. In a sense, this is a phenomenological thinker creating phenomenological agents (which technically could be observable and contain all the specific information of each cell in the body and transmit it in a type of 1:1 relation to each of the developing cells of the offspring) to explain the functions of heredity. From our point of view, more then a hundred years later, molecular genetics has shown that there is a reductive language of genetics that is, in fact, not necessarily directly observable. For example, you cannot observe the abstract relationship between a codon and the amino acid it codes for. With this in mind, could it be argued that Darwin's theory of pangenesis is an example of where foundational beliefs themselves often function as a bias in the construction of a theory? Is this an example of why these foundational beliefs occasionally need to be overturned in new paradigms and why the hope of a teleological progression is naive?

On the topic of nature selecting for local improvements within individuals and the way these improvements lead to the maximization of success, not only within the individual but throughout the population.
These improvements are considered to be so due to the success of the individual which acquires such improvements. So the state of maximizing, say reproductive success, in an individual is the result of natural selection choosing that state from a set of possible states. And if these states operate within the constraints of possible variation within that individual how can we say that natural selection chooses the best of these states. Is it not that natural selection just eliminates those who cannot suffice for the time being...

My question is:
Is it more advantageous for individuals to acquire a sufficient state of improvement rather than acquiring the "best" state of improvement? Keeping in mind the notion of specialized characteristics. ie: a bird with a specialized beak that can easily open seed A but forfeits the ability to open seed B completely. Is it not the case that this specialized bird would thrive in an environment with plenty of seed A available. But if there was also a bird that could open seed A and seed B sufficiently but did not excel at either, would this bird still not be better suited for the changing environment in which these birds would be located. It would make sense that the specialized beak be advantageous for as long as seed A was also successful but the more specialized the beak becomes does this not also come at a higher risk to that lineage of bird of confining the food gathering ability?
Does specialization within species ultimately lead to a dead evolutionary branch? And does this mean the less specialized individuals maintaining the "trunk" of the evolutionary tree represent a more stable and longer lasting part of that tree?

My question has to do with the scientific conversations taking place on speciation and variation around the time immediately preceding Darwin's publication of Origin.
Darwin writes that he is more interested those variations which are inherited than those which are not. Furthermore, he pays more attention to the instances where there exists a correlation in the age of appearance of a trait (in parent and offspring) than he does to transmission patterns (p 14). Historically, the common option among scientifically inclined thinkers such as Cuvier and Lyell was that variation existed, but that there were limitations to this variation. Is it the case that these beginning chapters of the Origin are the first formal response to this assumption on the limits of variation, with the idea being that inherited variation demonstrates a permanence not previously attributed to variation in either domesticated or wild animals? And does the argument continue on with the appearance of traits at correlating stages of development standing as evidence of the operation of natural selection after conception?

In class on Thursday, I recall a small part of the lecture referencing the fact that, "Darwin was in fact embarrassed by too much perfection, which would have been seen as evidence for a creator, and so delighted in pointing out contingent, patchwork, make do solutions." (Wimsatt, "The Image of Perfection and its Demise" p.2) At this same point we discussed examples of these solutions that Darwin mentions seeing in nature (i.e. bee/orchid interaction, blood supply in front of the retina, etc.). It seems as though in order to convince his 19th century readers (and, in fact, still many 21st century readers) that natural selection is a valid theory, he needed to show where creationism fails.

My question, then, is mostly structural: why does he never reference the creationism? It seems standard that in order to refute an argument one usually must provide an argument to be refuted! Is this just because "Origin of Species" is a biological work? Or perhaps this is coming in later chapters?

To what extent did Darwin consider natural selection a predictive theory? Darwin seems to give conflicting views on this matter, claiming early that the complicated and sometimes mystical effects of heredity and conditions of life create an infinitely complex system [Chapter 1, p.43], yet goes on to make a prediction regarding the effect that a rise in population of cats in England would have on particular plant species [Chapter 3, p. 74]. Did Darwin have hopes for natural selection beyond pure description? Given modern information of heredity and genetics, which demystify the laws of descent greatly in comparison to Darwin’s position, would Darwin regard his theory as markedly more apt to prediction? Or would the complexity of the systems in which it naturally operates still make it essentially descriptive?

On the topic of forces mentioned in the Explanation and Evolution Among the Greeks, there is the idea that everything has order because of certain forces, and without them there would be disorder. With the addition of idea that God made nature perfect, one might say that this idea is the reason why science progressed so quickly. The question then can be derived from the Anthropic Principle, which states that all observations made from a physical universe perspective must be compatible with those who are observing it. Based off of this, can it be said that explaining the world through the idea of fine-tuning should lead one to believe that creationism is a better explanation for the existence of life, as compared to evolution? If so, should there be more attempts to find other ways to sustain life (this could be done by figuring out if there other planets capable of supporting life), before completely making the idea of creationism obsolete?

Natural theology is based on several assumptions. These assumptions are: God is the creator of nature, nature is inherently perfect and God intended for man to know nature. Therefore, based on these assumptions, we should study nature to reach a better understanding of God’s intention for us. This way of thinking seems parallel to Phenomenological views, and therefore very similar to that of Aristotle and Darwin, yet the readings say that Darwin was embarrassed by too much perfection and deliberately tried to show “contingent, patchwork, make do solutions” that occurred in nature to refute evidence of a creator. Were Darwin’s views inconsistent? If so, why? Or, are phenomenological views different from that of natural theology?

In Chapter III Darwin discusses the rates in which organisms increase in population size as one component of the “struggle for existence”. Darwin refers to Malthus on page 64, which is of no surprise since it is known that Darwin’s theory of natural selection was influenced by An Essay on the Principle of Population. Darwin states that man is not immune to overpopulation concerns by saying, “Even slow-breeding man has doubled in twenty-five years, and at this rate, in a few thousand years, there would literally not be standing room for his progeny.” (Darwin, p. 65) He goes on to discuss the checks that limit a population’s growth; a few such examples are the availability of food and water, climate, and epidemics. With increasing technology, man has been able to eliminate many of these natural checks, but has technology itself now become one of the greatest checks for mankind?

Before the Industrial Revolution, the world’s population remained relatively static. The Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions made it easier to provide the essential components of life to more people, which in turn increased life expectancies dramatically. Even though most modern technologies don’t seem to be essential for individual survival, have they become essential for the survival of world’s population as a whole? Without modern farming equipment, medical technologies, and even computers, we wouldn’t be able to provide such large quantities of food, water, and medicine in order to sustain the current level of human population. It goes without saying that the increase of technology amplifies the demand of the earth’s natural resources, which are other checks on human population size as well.

In Chapter II, Darwin spends a lot of time detailing the difficulties scientists had at the time differentiating between species of organisms and mere "varieties." He uses this difficulty as support for his eventual argument for the common ancestry of some groups of organisms. Darwin comments that he believes "specie" and "variety" are arbitrary terms. How did scientists assign "species" at the time? Was the Biological Species Concept being used yet? Did Darwin ever give an alternative possibility for classifying organisms, since he viewed the currently used method as arbitrary?

It was discuss in class the explanation and evolution among Greeks. In Aristotle’s statement about heredity he say: “For man is generated from man; and thus it is the possession of certain character by the parent that determines the development of like characters in the child.” In Darwin origin of species he say: “peculiarities appearing in the males of our domestic breeds are often transmitted either exclusively, or in a much greater degree, to males alone.” Could both of then perceive the same aspect of observation and came with different ideas? How could observation of the same problem cold lead to different conclusions?

My question comes from The Image of Perfection and Its Demise but ties in with On The Origin of Species. One of the assumptions of natural theology is that nature is perfect because it is God’s creation. A natural theologian, John Ray’s work “lead to a tradition of English parson-naturalists who collected and described species and investigated their behavior” which contributed to Darwin’s theory. What I understood from chapter three of On the Origin of Species is that natural selection, specifically increasing numbers and struggle for survival, is a necessity to be able to better adapt to our environment and to keep from overpopulating. This leads me to wonder if the natural theologians accepted Darwin’s theory after contributing to it and what did they attribute the struggle for survival to? I find this interesting because I would assume that they would not attribute death of an organism to God since they put him on such a pedestal. But then in their eyes, why does death occur?

After reading the first 4 chapters of Darwin’s 1859 and reading the handouts from class, I was struck by the similarity in evolutionary theory of Empedocles and Darwin. In the handout labeled “Explanation and Evolution Among the Greeks” Empedocles theory is stated as “most combinations are unfit, but when you get a fit combination, it reproduces itself and grows in numbers”. This is very much akin to Darwin’s idea of random mutations arising that produce a more competitive organism that is then given the opportunity to reproduce and pass on its survivable characteristics. As stated in the handout, “For Darwin, ‘accidental’ properties could become ‘essential’ through evolution and speciation”. Combining Empedocles theory to Darwin’s, it could be stated that species that become extinct are “unfit” combinations, while those that survive are the result of random “fit” combinations (Darwin would call these mutations) which create an organism that can survive and reproduce. If Empedocles had a chance to read Darwin’s 1859, what do you think his greatest criticisms would be? If Empedocles was considered a philosopher that produced theories more along the lines of reductive versus phenomenological thought, how would he respond to Darwin’s explaining observable phenomena in terms of observable causes?

If phenomenological theories are restricted to observable causal mechanisms and reductive theories seek to explain the underlying, unobservable forces that direct all observable phenomena, then we must more clearly define what is means to be "observable". Innovation and technology have opened new windows into the inner workings of the cosmos, allowing us to observe the previously unobservable. What are some examples (assuming they exist) in the history of science where a theory was originally considered reductive, but were later deemed more phenomenological as new observations became possible?

Also, do all reductive theories presuppose that there is some primary level of existence where no further explanation is necessary? Wouldn't that entail a sort of foundational metaphysics, where there is some self-evident, prime, universal force that underlies all higher level phenomena? Or is the phenomenological/reductive distinction more comparative than objective, and there is a never-ending continuum of phenomena which we have limited observational access to?

I am wondering what concepts espoused by Darwin in his manuscript, "The Origins of Species..." are today taken for granted. Such as the succession of genes through the offspring of the most fruitful individuals gradually spreading through a gene pool at a greater rate than those of the individuals less fruitful, i.e. survival of the fittest. And variation of species via location, climate, and several other environmental factors that play a crucial role in the determining of specific characteristics. What other notions, if any, promulgated in Darwin's text have become primary presumptions in the process of dealing with the natural phenomena of development, heredity, and evolution?

Darwin is most well known for his novel ideas captured in his book "The Origin of Species". Most of the research was gathered during his voyage on the Beagle. He studied ecological complexity, evolution and behaviour. According to "The Image of Perfection and its Demise" handout, Darwin "was in fact embarassed by too much perfection, which would have been seen as evidence for a creator, and so delighted in pointing out contingent, patchwork, make do solutions." This implies that Darwin's work was biased favoring his own ideas. How did he compensate for his assumtions with science? What opposition did he face or who disagreed with his ideas? This is important because we need to understand where our knowledge comes from and if it is in fact reliable.

This line of thought also brings up the distinction between an entity (a material being that is potential observable) and a force, which is in essence unobservable except through its material effects. So how can we distinguish an entity from a byproduct of unobservable forces? Or is that just what matter is: an expression of immaterial forces? And if matter is an expression of immaterial forces (energy), then the distinction between entity and force is merely an illusion.

Perhaps we use entities as substitutes for forces (in scientific explanation) because material concepts are much easier for our classically-inclined minds to grasp; if we are finite, material minds (as Darwinism suggests) then it may be impossible for us to grasp the infinite, immaterial concepts that a true evolutionary understanding of the cosmos requires.

Perhaps I am missing what exactly it is you are referring to, however, as I interpret those quotations: Aristotle claims that we inherit character from both of our parents and Darwin states, more specifically, that traits are usually passed on to a greater degree from male to male.

I do not see how these ideas are all that different. What I see as happening is a more detailed explanation by Darwin. This, I presume, is for a variety of reasons. (1) Aristotle may very well have been one of the first man to write on this idea of heredity, which is pretty profound in and of itself. Darwin is writing about 2,100 years after this idea has had time to resonate with philosophers and scientist alike. (2) Darwin was a biologist dedicating his life to examining details in plant and animal life. While Aristotle was a scientist as well, he was also a philosopher meaning that he had great abilities to analyze the physical world but science was not his only concern or focus.

Hope that makes sense! :)

pinte016 asked:
Is it the case that these beginning chapters of the Origin are the first formal response to this assumption on the limits of variation, with the idea being that inherited variation demonstrates a permanence not previously attributed to variation in either domesticated or wild animals? And does the argument continue on with the appearance of traits at correlating stages of development standing as evidence of the operation of natural selection after conception?

I found Darwin's discussion of traits appearing at later stages of development to be a great example of Prof. Love's point that Darwin conflates heredity and development. What I find interesting and illuminating about your question is that it points to some real conceptual work that grouping heredity and development does for Darwin. If we cleve the two apart, in the context of 19th century debates, then it seems we do run into difficulty with the preservation of variation—if development is determined predominantly by environmental factors, for example, then we are faced with the probability that development would smooth over variation rather than preserve or increase it.

Combining the two, as Darwin does, provides a stronger argument that the degree variation within a population can be preserved, offering a more colorful palette from which natural selection can work.

In response to Emily's questions though particularly the following: "And if matter is an expression of immaterial forces (energy), then the distinction between entity and force is merely an illusion."
I found this question and the series of questions leading to it incredibly interesting. However, I do not think that a possible conclusion or answer is that the distinction between entity and force is an illusion. By elucidating the confusion in the following manner, we can see why. Let us accept that something is either a force or an entity, as Emily has defined. Additionally, let us grant that 'entity' and 'force' are mutually exclusive terms. So, if we accept that matter is an expression or byproduct of unobservable forces, then it is not the case that we must accept that matter and forces are the same. Something's being a byproduct of something else does not imply that it is characteristically the same. Furthermore, could there not be genuine emergent properties from the interaction of forces to create what we deem 'material'? In other words, if some strange interaction of forces or energy results in matter, and matter has different fundamental properties from its constituent forces, it seems entirely acceptable to classify the two as distinct. The stuff of matter, though it is the result of energy, may not be systematically reducible to the terms of 'energy.' Though I am not an expert in physics, I think matter can be simply described as something which takes up space. Energy does not have this property. So there is something quite distinct between matter and energy, regardless of whether matter springs from energy. I hope this helps. If not, at the very least I hope it encourages more conversation. If my physics is poor, please chime in!

craw0119 asked:
"...With this in mind, could it be argued that Darwin's theory of pangenesis is an example of where foundational beliefs themselves often function as a bias in the construction of a theory? Is this an example of why these foundational beliefs occasionally need to be overturned in new paradigms and why the hope of a teleological progression is naive?"

I think this is an interesting train of thought. Immediately after reading this the words of William Wimsatt filled my head... "we are all here to rub off each other's biases" and I think this is precisely what Darwin did with his studies and development of his theory leading up to him "giving up on God." Clearly the personal bias or belief in a God has a strong and fundamental hold on any possible theory that a person could develop. I think it is also very important to note here that without this prior belief in God would Darwin have been able to see nature in the same way he did. That is, with reference to THE IMAGE OF PERFECTION AND ITS DEMISE pp.1 Section 1.a.2., isn't it the rational nature of God's creation that pushed Darwin (and many others) to seek the knowledge they all felt was intended, BY GOD, to be known by them."We should study nature to learn about the creator and his intentions for us."

I think this is a great example of the way fundamental biases need to be overturned IN ORDER for new paradigms to truly emerge and take hold. New paradigms do not emerge unless something formally accepted is rejected or vice versa, at least in my current definition of paradigm.

I do not quite understand how you validate your claim of "teleological progression" being naive... Or at least not in the context of what you wrote. I would be interested in clarification and mutual understanding of shared ideas here.

An exceptionally provocative extension of craw0119's post. The sciences seem to be blurring the distinction between matter and energy (entities and forces). Light is both a particle and a wave. We have the brain and the mind. And there are genes and the environment. These couplets are inextricably bound to one another. The play off each other like moon and the earth. Maybe the more we develop our comprehension of these diametric systems, humanity stretches closer and closer to perceiving the infinite?

Could that be the teleological progression?? For humans to ween that ability from the breast of creation? Naive may have been a harsh word, but teleological progression is certainly contradictory in the context of Darwin's natural selection. Natural selection has no apparent direction; traits that nature selects have such peculiarity to them in some cases, that it is beyond rational thought to decipher their advantage or their origination. Prof. Wimsatt mentioned orchids and their bizarre reproductive behaviors. How did they accomplish those tricky mechanisms? HOW?? As a natural theologist, Darwin would necessarily be compelled to feel that he could, or at least a contemporary of his would, compile an explanation for nature's selected idiosyncrasies. Alas, when none were forth coming, he placed his faith in his research and probably asked for God's forgiveness.

Perhaps "continuum" should not be considered as a linear structure, but more a cyclical or coherent concept.* At some point when we reduce phenomena down to the lowest level it jumps to the highest level of phenomena. It shifts from being barely observable (only observable indirectly and/or through sophisticated technology) to universally observable (ex. subatomic theories explain all cosmic phenomena). So the question is: at what level of reduction does shift this occur? Or is it possible to blink spontaneously from one level to another?

*If the shift occurs at some precise level, than we are left with a cyclical metaphysics. If we can blink spontaneously, then it is a more coherent metaphysics.

I think the best we could hope for is exponential progression toward cosmic understanding, with absolute reason being the limit we continue to approach but can never attain.

And that is the best case scenario...

When I brought up the naivety of a teleological progression, I was giving a specific shout out, as it were, to Kuhn. His argument, especially in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, made a pretty convincing case for why a belief in 'Science' as a fount of knowledge which allows us an unmitigated look under the hood of 'Nature' is a bit naive. Why the notion of science as a smooth march toward some future, attainable goal isn't all that accurate (or desirable?). Kuhn's entire concept of a progression to the scientific endeavor as occurring from paradigmatic leap to paradigmatic leap makes a teleological progression somewhat tenuous.

I think this intermingles with the discussion of what the limits of a phenomenological outlook are. Emily pointed out that this type of discussion pivots around a definition of what 'observable' is – a definition that is certainly not static. Since scientific discovery is often linked to the invention of new tools, it shouldn't come as a surprise that when we are presented with an instrument that allows us to see smaller or larger things than what our eyes were evolutionarily selected to see, we usually need to update our definitions of reality. Invent a tool that can directly monitor a neutrino, WIMPs or a Higgs Boson (LHC, I'm looking at you), then watch it for a while – you may have a new paradigm on your hands. But, even with this new sense data upon which to work, there still needs to be that creative element that layers context and causality upon the phenoma themselves. We need to produce models, often times ones that stipulate forces and laws that are unobservable, abstract and even linguistic in nature. Their potency as predictors functions as the main criteria towards their truth. Is this where reductionism and phenomenology meet, argue and agree to disagree? Are we going to reach a point where future tools allow us to actually observe some indivisible, underlying structure? I'm not sure. Or, will the concept of structure itself always be empirically enigmatic and, instead, have to be a story we tell ourselves about the things we observe, even if they are apparently the building blocks of the universe itself?

I find this to be an interesting question, because you question whether or not natural theologians accepted Darwin's theory, while I believe it to be possible for them to have accepted his theory, I find it highly unlikely that they would admit to the idea of all species evolving from one organism, which would mean they didn't accept all of Darwin's theories. My understanding is that a natural theologian who accepts certain ideas from Darwin would probably tweak them to fit their beliefs by saying that something like natural selection is part of Gods perfect design. It seems like you think natural theologians believe in a God who only creates and doesn't destroy, which doesn't seem to be the case for many natural theologians.

I found this to be an interesting question because it would seem that way and had to "look outside the box" to give my answer. Living in the United States, I think it would seem like many of the sources of checks would be eliminated by technology, but not every country has access to the kind of technology we use. There are a lot of underdeveloped countries that struggle because they do not have the access to food, water, and medicines like we do. There are also natural disasters that occur even around here to keep things in check such as Hurricane Katrina and other parts of the world such as the earthquake in Haiti and flooding in Pakistan. Even illnesses that we have vaccines against have kept the population in check (West Nile, Swine Flu).

The first thing that comes to mind when answering the question is natural disasters/unexpected climate changes and how this would affect a species that is specialized in one area. For example, say a bird becomes extremely skilled at opening up seed A and can no longer open up seed B, and this is fine because 99% of the trees in the area produce seed A, but then a disease runs rampant in the area killing all trees that produce seed A. All of the sudden the birds that could only open up seed A will no longer be able to eat and they become extinct. However at this point, those that maintained the ability to open A AND B will thrive. Natural selection will shift the birds in the opposite direction and begin selecting for birds that can open up seed B well because that is all that exists in the area now. I think that less specialized individuals in principle are a better idea, but the nature of evolution is twords specialization.

Darwin does at least once refer to creationism in On the Origin of Species, when he gives the general definition of species by naturalists of his time as including "the unknown element of a distinct act of creation."(Chapter 2, p. 44) There could be several reasons, though, for his more general refusal to give and then argue against creationism. I believe he considered natural selection to be an indirect argument against the specific type of creationism that claims all species were created at once, distinctly. Thus, he need not mention creationism, as evolution excludes this possibility. Once he has convinced his reader that natural selection is true, he has also convinced him or her that not all species were distinctly created. This is interesting because it does still leave open the possibility of a more broad conception of creationism, as is often used by proponents of creationism today. That argument, though, is not biological, and thus should not be treated or even mentioned in Darwin's work.

roha0014:
To what extent did Darwin consider natural selection a predictive theory? Darwin seems to give conflicting views on this matter, claiming early that the complicated and sometimes mystical effects of heredity and conditions of life create an infinitely complex system [Chapter 1, p.43], yet goes on to make a prediction regarding the effect that a rise in population of cats in England would have on particular plant species [Chapter 3, p. 74]. Did Darwin have hopes for natural selection beyond pure description? Given modern information of heredity and genetics, which demystify the laws of descent greatly in comparison to Darwin’s position, would Darwin regard his theory as markedly more apt to prediction? Or would the complexity of the systems in which it naturally operates still make it essentially descriptive?

I think that there are several interesting questions posed here. First, I think that much of what motivated Darwin in his thinking about his theory was that it was explanatory-that is to say, that it went beyond being descriptive of what was going on in terms of change in nature to being able to begin to explain why or how these changes were occurring. Before continuing on with this idea of natural selection being explanatory rather than merely descriptive, it is important to understand that a the fundamental aspect of natural selection is that changes in nature are random. Therefore, we have to be careful when we talk about predictive power in the classical sense of being able to mathematically calculate observable results in science.

“On the Origin of Species” is most definitely a biological piece of work, and thus Darwin’s intent was not to discredit or even begin to engage in an argument against creationism. The intention was simply to introduce his theory of evolution and natural selection, during a time when numerous evolutionary theories were being contemplated. Science can never disprove God since religious belief is based on faith, but as you mention science does have the ability to point out the flaws in creationist arguments. That being said, oftentimes in order for scientific theories to be deemed credible, especially when tackling controversial topics, they need to simply provide the observational and experimental data without attacking opposing arguments.

Stephen Hawking’s newest book, “The Grand Design” and interviews with the world-renowned physicist led to a number of highly contentious media articles including blatant statements about God not being part of the creation of the universe. Upon actually reading his book, one would find that the book is based solely on Hawking’s knowledge and understanding of cosmology and physics, and is devoid of any direct argument against God. I believe his theories put forth in the book are more credible since he provided strong scientific evidence instead of just simply pointing out the flaws in creationism.

That is an excellent question and I have thought the same thing myself. I believe that Darwins religious views are what get in his way more than anything when it comes to comparing humans to animals and putting us in the same category for natural selection. Also, there is the possibility that Darwin doesn't want to put humans on the same level as other animals. I know people that are atheists and believe in evolution but still refuse to categorize humans as animals, be it a pride issue or the great differences in behavior and intelligence.

I wonder the same thing myself. And even might argue that postulating the unobservable in order to explain the observable is both proof of a bias founded in a prior belief and will indirectly interfere with the interpretation of the results. It is historically accurate to say that the scientific paradigms move in trend with shifts in accepted cultural beliefs. whether it is the paradigm of science or the culturally accepted assumptions which shift first, I will not attempt to claim here. This being the case, it is not appropriate to identify the development of science as linear. And THIS being the case, a teleological progression is not only a naive hope, but more than likely it is an impossibility.

This is an interesting comment, as it relates Darwin's theory to contemporary concerns. Though technology and, in turn, improved standards of living for many people throughout the world, can increase the demand for natural resources, many advances in technology are also intended to alleviate the demand for resources, or shift these demands to other resources. Theoretically, technology could allow for the colonization of other planets after Earth's natural resources have been depleted, so I would argue that technology is more inclined to alleviate the checks on human reproduction than to serve as a check itself.

I think that a little bit of both had to do with Darwin not applying evolution to man in his book, On The Origin of Species. Being religious, Darwin didn't want to upset religious people by applying evolution to man. He also didn't want to cause havoc in the scientific community by publishing his ideas on how man came to be. It is known that Darwin's religious beliefs dwindled over time especially with the death of his daughter, Annie. I think after that happened, Darwin was more concerned with how the scientific community would respond to his ideas. That is why I think Darwin published his book, The Descent of Man, which gets at what Darwin really wanted to get at with evolution, which is evolution applied to man. I agree with the notion that Darwin wanted to ease evolutionary theory into the public to see how it would be received before he applied it to humans.

I cannot speak on behalf of Darwin, but my impression of his intentions for applications of his theory seem mainly descriptive. He seemed driven to understand the mechanisms in nature that resulted in speciation and to give current examples for these mechanisms. I never got the sense that Darwin intended for the theory to be predictive, as he refers to the complex and chaotic nature of the environment numerous times; qualities that would make any type of prediction difficult. Also, in order to make predictions using his theory one would have to know the somewhat long term status of a local environment as well as what local traits are advantageous or not. With that being said, it would be difficult to apply any type of predictive function to his theory, which I believe was intended to be mainly of descriptive value.