Question Submission 3

In this week’s reading "Leibniz’s law on the indiscernibility of identicals" was referenced when explaining inter-level reduction. The law states that if two things are identical in nature, they will possess all the same properties. Is this law parallel to the basic views that support inter-level reduction? What key characteristics are they observing when they label them as being identical? It seems to me that there would be many cases where one would observe two identical organisms that possess many different features. This is where my confusion lies. How similar do they intend these two things to be? Are they talking about identical twins, for example, which have the same genetic make-up, or are they talking about a general similarity between all human beings? We are all structured the same way, have the same number of chromosomes, yet, there are key differences between all of us based on our unique genetic code.

This question stems largely from my ignorance of the detailed history surrounding this research, but I've found it to be a nagging one.

I found it easy to see selectionist thinking Roux. The first paragraph of his 1883 strikes me as particularly susceptible to this reading. The canonical picture of the history of biology, however, tells us that microbiological theories of inheritance were not firmly tied to natural selection until the modern synthesis of the 1930s. I can think of two ways to explain my impulse to see Darwin in Roux, and each one leads me to a different question (each of which I think is interesting whether the motivating premise holds true or not):

1. I am reading Darwin into Roux - In the case that Roux had no interest in looking at selection, we are still left with the fact that he uses some language that is highly suggestive of selection (I set aside, for the sake of argument, the possibility that this was anachronistically introduced through translation). This makes me wonder how the furor over Darwin's work shaped the form of scientific discourse in nineteenth century biology. Did the virulence of the debate over Darwinian evolution exert pressures on the vocabulary of biology that inclines us to see selectionist talk where none exists?

2. Roux, indeed, seeks to import selectionist thinking into cytology - This eventuality leads me to ask what problems Roux might have faced with such a dramatic shift in scale from the level of phenotypic traits to the level of cells. I believe, although I might be mistaken, that Roux's 1883 paper precedes any clear framing of the levels of selection debate. The debate need not be clearly framed to have importance, though. In that light, what difficulties would Roux or others face when applying a nineteenth century understanding of selection to the celular level?

While Theodore Boveri was performing his study on Sea Urchin Chromosomes, the belief was that if things look alike, they are alike in other ways. Boveri believed this to be wrong. He thought that the chromosomes acted differently and all were necessary for development. Boveri set up a double fertilization experiment in sea urchins, where two sperm fertilized an embryo. In the first case, both sperm divided giving four centrosomes in a single cell and another cased showed the centrosome of one sperm to divide and the other remained single. With 108 total chromosomes after the first mitotic division, they need to divide into 36 chromosomes in a cell for it to develop. In the first case, only one of the 1,500 developed normally and 58 of the 719 developed normally in the second case. Boveri noticed that the division was unequal with some cells receiving many chromosomes with the others on receiving a few. What determines how many chromosomes go into each cell? Does this also apply to humans or just to animals that have many offspring? If it does apply to humans, what accounts for the even separation of chromosomes, especially when monozygotic twins form? I find this interesting, if it does apply to humans, that there are a large amount of monozygotic twins that develop and develop without abnormalities. So why would there better a better success rate for the human population?

At the time of Boveri's experiment, were the microscope limitations a
factor in the development of his hypothesis and an influence to his
observations? At the time I believe it wasn't possible to see an individual
strand of uncondensed DNA at 2 nanometers wide, so Boveri must have
literally been watching the chromosomes "disappear" and only reappear for a
small part of the cell cycle before division. How did he suspect
chromosomes were the number one driving force behind proper development
when most of the cells he was looking at at any one time didn't have them?

My question arose when reading "6 Identities and Localizations" from the assigned reading for this week. pp.456
Where I become confused is in reading "Exact localizations of two things to the same spatio-temporal region preserve all spatio-temporal properties of identities,12 and thus all of their local causal relations arising from these spatial relationships.13" and then trying to understand how ALL local causal relations arise from the spatial relationships. Especially with the consideration of the hidden scale-dependence, which makes note of the refinement needed in the bounded S-T region, and the possibilities of mismatch between these boundaries and precision differences.

So, has there been advancements towards eliminating, or limiting, this hidden scale-dependence? And, are these advancements of importance to further discovery or will the approximate localizations provide enough identification for our needs?

In Prof. Wimsatt’s 2006 paper, he demonstrates the empirical fruitfulness of inter-level identifications and localizations. That empirical fruitfulness is not achieved by mere correspondence statements. Prof. Wimsatt shows that making a strong identity claim between chromosomes and Mendelian factors, even after only a few initial correspondences between properties of the two, provided scientists with powerful and testable predictions about additional properties of the two entities. Hence, Prof. Wimsatt demonstrates the value of inter-level identity theories. Then, at what point are we metaphysically committed to the identity? It is clear, after reading this article, that identity claims are powerful heuristic tools, but do we also have some extra scientific criteria for judging when they are actually true? Is it the predictive powers of the inter-level identification? Or is there something more?

This question is based on reading Wimsatt 2006. I agree that both science and philosophy are purpose and goal directed human activities. Is seems to me that Wimsatt is saying that the practice of positing identities is justified in science when they serve the goals of scientific inquiry. These goals seem to be things like furthering research, generating hypotheses, and making predictions. If the methodology of biology is to be applied to philosophy (I take this as one of the broad claims of the paper) then Wimsatt must have in mind that the goals of science and philosophy are the same or at least significantly overlap.
My questions are then, what does Wimsatt think of the goals of philosophy as being, and do people think that philosophy and science have the same or similar goals?

I am interested in Roux's use of the word "qualities" in "On the Significance of Nuclear Division Figures." It does not seem apparent that Roux uses the word in the hereditary sense in which it is frequently used today, but it nevertheless has the connotation of hereditary processes. Is there any evidence that Roux suspected chromosomes were central to heredity? If not (which I am almost certain is the case), is the appearance of the word "qualities" a later editorial choice that was made with a more advanced scientific understanding of heredity? Or was Roux simply using the word in an outmoded fashion? If the former is true, it would be an interesting case of revision in history through translation (given that the editor has an more advanced knowledge of the subject matter than the original author) which may not be uncommon.

My question comes from the Boveri's paper "On Multipolar Mitosis as a Means of Analysis of the Cell Nucleus" when he says, "To be sure, the chromosomes as carriers of different qualities have to be present in each cell in a certain minimal number comprising all qualities; but beyond this, their number is irrelevant up to an upper limit harmful for other reasons; and in the reverse sense, a normal chromosome number in all cells, which is possible in tripolar eggs, does not guarantee normal development." It appears that he has concluded that the chromosomes are the key to normal development in the cell however, What does he mean when he says "their number is irrelevant up to an upper limit harmful for other reasons…". If a cell can has a normal amount of chromosomes, but does not develop correctly, what is his theory for why a cell may not develop correctly?

My question has to do with Dr. Wimsatt's paper Reductionism and its Heuristics, in particular centering around the role that heuristics play. Wimsatt writes that "[p]hilosophers start in the wrong place to understand most debates in the complex sciences, taking the levels of the reduced phenomena and reducing apparatus as givens." Is the same mistake made by the scientist as well? In other words, can the same be said to be true of curriculums taught to soon-to-be scientists? That is to say, it seems as though oftentimes in science, these reduced phenomena are heuristics that become the very things that are taught in lieu of an ontologically robust understanding. I am thinking for example, the concept of genes or the concept of an electron in a classical orbit model atom. (But perhaps I am simply confused?) If this is the case, can we say that heuristics have the potential to linger within theories, necessitating some sort of (for lack of a better term) extraction technique by either the philosopher or the scientist? And if not, is there realistic hope for both the scientist and the philosopher to in a sense 'keep track' of what particular kind of heuristic is being used, as well as reign in the effects that it may have on future questions that are born from models relying heavily on these heuristics?

In Moore’s Chapter 4 “Chromosomes and Inheritance”, Moore talked about how before Boveri’s experiments with the sea urchins it was believed that within any single species, one chromosome was about the same as another. The thought behind this was that the chromosomes looked identical in shape and reacted alike to fixation and staining, so they must be alike in other ways as well. Boveri however thought that the each chromosome was unique, and each individual chromosome had their own specific role in development. He stated that it was necessary for sea urchins to have all 36 chromosomes for normal development. After reading through his experiment, I disagreed with Boveri’s conclusion stated by Moore as “his results showed that each chromosome in the set must be endowed with a specific quality and that all are necessary for normal development”. The only thing that Boveri proved through his experiment was that it was necessary to have 36 chromosomes, but this is no way proved that the 36 chromosomes had a unique quality about them that was necessary for development. I am curious to know if there were any criticisms for Boveri after he published his paper. Was the science community skeptical of relevance of his results? Moore talks about how Sutton’s argument on grasshopper chromosomes was strengthened by Boveri’s previous work with the sea urchins, but how? To me, Sutton’s work seems a lot more groundbreaking than Boveri’s.

My Week 3 question Submission:

My main question arose from the reading Reduction and its heuristics: Making methodological reductionism honest by William C. Wimsatt. On page 16-17 of the PDF (page 460) of the text Wimsatt is arguing that in developing an explanation of a theory people start with simpler models that simplify or ignore higher-order interactions. He states that starting this way leads to varying success. In the next paragraph he brings up that focusing on a single level or single class of causes for the decomposition leads to more errors, and that analyzing complex systems often requires simultaneous use of different decomps, boundaries and contexts. (he also says that Philosophers start in the wrong place to understand most debates in the complex sciences).

Is Wimsatt arguing that decompositions of arguements and theories should all start at a very wide varied and unfocused study? Is he arguing that focusing on a major factor leads to a higher amount of errors than a broad spectrum look?

As a note, this reading was very difficult for me to understand. Hence, it is entirely possible that my question will make absolutely no sense or be answered elsewhere in the reading.

On page 450 of Wimsatt's article, he states, "Unlike similarity relations in successional reductions, these references are transitive across levels, though the explanations may not be transitive due to different explanatory foci at different levels." As I interpret this claim, concepts, theories, etc. have transitive relations (if theory A related to theory B and theory B relates to theory C, then theory A relates to theory C). However, this is not the case with explanations. This translates to me that we cannot explain big concepts (i.e. the ecosystem) using smaller concepts that are related to it (i.e. organisms, cells and so on).

These small concepts inside a theory taken individually clearly do not explain our big theory completely. However, taken in context, they each help to explain pieces of the theory. i.e. for our ecosystem example, understanding photosynthesis would help to understand whether a rain forest would intake or emit carbon dioxide. However, clearly, understanding the rain forest is more complicated than understanding cellular processes like photosynthesis.

Hence, my question is in what way is explanation not transitive?

William Wimsatt’s makes the case in his 2006 article that a heuristic approach can be utilized to reach a more complete and accurate understanding of complex biological processes such as the genetic inheritance of alleles and chromosomes that in turn generate specific phenotypical traits. Wimsatt suggests applying a strategy of inter-level reduction, by relating higher-level processes to the lower- level processes. The tactic can be applied to an exceedingly complex process to conger up new predictions based upon what is known of the less complex processes that are encompassed by the higher-level. But a problem of this seems to be that the qualities of a new biological theory is predicated upon previous scientific doctrine; therefore, there appears to be the very real possibility of a theory being inadequate in explaining a phenomenon because a processes on which the theory relies on could be either inaccurate or not understood to a great enough extent. My question: Can it be that science’s interpretations of certain biological phenomena are flawed due to a misguided reliance on heuristics and reductionism which, in turn, is preventing further understanding?

"Reductive explanations are driven by referential identities or localizations - not by theoretical similarities...identities and localizations are powerful hypothesis generators for an articulatory reductionist." -Wimsatt

My philosophical experience I believe is lacking. I certainly felt beyond my depth reading Wimsatt's essay, maybe I am just novice. Nonetheless this excerpt struck a chord in me. Reductive explanations are the only means by which the sciences expand into new specialties, are they not? Reductive explanations are like an inverted fork in the road, where the scientist is brought to a singular perception from multiple directions. The merger of multiple fields would certainly bewilder me at first, but through the methodology of phenomenological study, the original reductionist explanations would give way to empirical certitude. I am unable to imagine another process by which science in general can proceed to new fields of research. Every laboratory course I have ever taken always stresses the formulation of a hypothesis before the experiment. So, if a new field is being explored the first hypothesis must be of reductionist nature mustn't it? Because the mechanisms have not been observed within the framework of the new genre's methodology. Thus my question is, by what other theoretical means do the sciences develop new disciplines? Am I completely wrong to think that reductionist explanations are the foundations of the fruition of scientific truth and the growth of human understanding, even though it is the phenomenological methodology that refines and crystallizes the imagination of innovators?

Boveri’s work in the early 1900’s, as mentioned in class, was a later foundation for a number of different hypotheses/predictions. Not only were his results significant, but his methodological approach to the experiment was quite ingenious. The only manipulations Boveri made to the experiment were to vary the number of sperm in an egg’s environment. After this was done, Boveri let nature take its course and took the role of a patient observer. Carrying out over 2200 fertilizations (Moore 1972, Ch. 4 ), Boveri displayed an incredible amount of perseverance (as mentioned in class, real-time observations of mitosis were not available; Boveri had to take fragmented data and piece them together). His results showed that a) it’s not the definite number of chromosomes that are essential in development, but rather a definite combination; b) individual chromosomes are unique and possess different qualities; c) cytoplasm is not the limiting factor in multiple divisions since it, but not the abnormal chromatin complement in daughter cells, can withstand development in these circumstances; and d) a normal chromosome number does not guarantee normal development, also suggesting that the combination of chromosomes is what’s important. All of these findings contradicted previous publications and all stemmed from the previously mentioned simple but ingenious methodological approach Boveri took. With that being said, what was more impressive of Boveri’s work: his experimental design, his patience in piecing together the enormous amounts of data, his work as an artist to communicate his results, his overall conclusions, or perhaps something that was not touched on?

In the reading “Early evidence for the nuclear control of inheritance” explain the points of view of four German scientists which believed that chromosomes were the physical basis of inheritance. With Flemming’s work of Mitosis in the 1882 and Boveri in Meiosis. Why their hypothesis was not accepted at that time? Does they do not have sufficient data to prove their theory? Or the Scientifics community was looking forward to another explanation?

Moore states that "At the time of [Boveri's] experiment, most cytologists believed that within any single species one chromosome was about the same as another." If this was the case, why did cytologists explain the presence of multiple chromosomes, and differences in chromosome number between species? Furthermore, in 1883 Roux hypothesized that the complexity of the mitotic process indicated its importance. Is there any evidence that Boveri was influenced by Roux? Could the fact that organisms had multiple chromosomes and the different numbers of chromosomes in different species (examples of complexity) have indicated to Boveri that each chromosome was important?

My question comes from reading William Wimsatt's 2006 paper. In Wimsatt's paper, he brings up Jaegwon Kim, a person that deals with metaphysics and the like with theories like the psycho-physical identity theory, dualism, and epiphenomenalism. Wimsatt makes the comment that, "Kim confuses metaphysical with scientific theories, but indeed, practice is so far from this abstract specification that one wonders whether any point is served by this form of metaphysical specification of the problem." Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that is concerned with explaining the fundamental nature of being and the world. Don't scientific theories try to explain fundamentals of the world as well? The theory of evolution tries to explain how inherited traits of a population are passed on through successive generations. To me it sounds like the theory of evolution is trying to explain a fundamental nature of the world. My question is, was Kim really wrong in speaking about scientific theories in metaphysical terms? (As a side note, Wimsatt's paper was a tough read and I'm not sure I understood it all that well, so my question might be sub par to say the least.)

By the end of the 19th century, preformationism had been discarded due to the emergence of cell theory, specifically the understanding of meiosis, mitosis, and fertilization. Epigenesis, the development of an organism through a sequence of steps, became the primary theory of embryologic development. Subsequent work by Boveri and Sutton provided significant links between development and heredity by identifying chromosomes as necessary components for normal development of an organism. Seeing that there are often competing views in the scientific community, were there any theories that included epigenesis but viewed development completely separate from heredity? Since cellular components and their functions were still being discovered, did anyone believe that the biological components involved in development that are the same in every individual (i.e. having the same organs) were different than those involved in the heredity material that makes us each different but more similar to our parents?

I am preoccupied with the debate over "American" vs. R.A. Fisherian interpretations of Mendel's work. Wimsatt is an outspoken proponent of the former. When did these continental generalizations take hold? And was Professor Wimsatt's education informed by them, thus giving him a preconception that the Fisher interpretation was wrong? Or considering Professor Wimsatt's notable influence within the field, did he help shape the American interpretation?

I'm interested in reading more about the development of this debate over Mendel's methodology. Does anyone know any good sources on the subject? I found "Ending the Mendel-Fisher Controversy" (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), but I just wanted to know if there was a better place to start.

I was interested in further exploring the significance of Boveri's and Sutton's work; in class we discussed that Boveri's experiments were pivotal in undermining alternative hypothesis. However, do these experiments only appear pivotal in hindsight? Where they considered pivotal at the time? And would Boveri's work count as a crucial experiment? Are crucial experiments even possible?

My question is based around the discovery of uniqueness of chromosomes and how exactly Boveri was able to reach the conclusion that all chromosomes must be unique. If at the time of Boveris research with sea urchins it was common thought that all chromosomes we relatively similar in nature and the variance was not great, why would he come to the conclusion that all chromosomes are unique. It is stated very clearly that he discovered that the urchin had 36 chromosomes and that all were needed for function. However, there is at no point a clear explanation of why he would conclude that they must all be unique. Was this explained in another set of work or writing? Would this, at the time, compromise the work of other researchers who may have trusted in this idea with little validity? If substantial evidence was not given how would this be accepted by the scientific community?

I think these experiments appear MORE pivotal in hindsight. I do not, however, think that any experiment that operated on that level of detail, especially for the time in which the experiment was developed, could be considered nonchalantly. AKA it was probably pivotal work back then as it was done within the German "community" (?) but the connections that are now associated with the work were not yet made possible. I think one reason that influenced why the experiments appear more pivotal in hindsight is that we already know the significance of the experiment and the work that became tied around it. Having this knowledge and being able to look back, through our interpretation, we think how pivotal it was... Of course people working on a hotly debated topic feel that sense of pride in their work. But how many people are busy working on projects, in which they take pride, and these projects never play a "pivotal" role in history.

Boveri's work to me, was a crucial experiment. I think this simply because we are talking about what he did a century later.
I think crucial experiments are possible. The most clear example I can think of is the Two | Slit | Experiment in Quantum~Mechanics.

I think this is an excellent question, and I too, would like to know what Wimsatt would say the goals of Philosophy are, especially in contrast to Biological goals. Prior to this course I had thought very little about the overlap of Philosophy and Biology. In introductory courses the two disciplines were never blended. I am beginning to see how critical it is to combine the two to reach a greater understanding of scientific principals. It seems to me that Biology focuses more on the mechanics of the science, while Philosophy questions why the theories work as they do, rather than another way.

Patrick Clifford asked
Thus my question is, by what other theoretical means do the sciences develop new disciplines? Am I completely wrong to think that reductionist explanations are the foundations of the fruition of scientific truth and the growth of human understanding, even though it is the phenomenological methodology that refines and crystallizes the imagination of innovators?

In response to the suggestion that reduction is the source of new directions in science, I would counter that, just as frequently, the failure of reduction leads to better scientific understanding at a higher level of organization. To offer some historical examples, the science of thermodynamics as developed by the likes of Thompson and Joule in England, and Clausius and Helmholtz in Germany, was motivated largely by the persistent failure of Newtonian mechanics to describe thermal phenomena. Considering the atomic hypothesis was still questionable at the time, early pioneers of thermodynamics consciously built a theory that would hold true irrespective of the physical nature of gasses at the micro-level. We can debate about whether the arrival of statistical interpretations of thermodynamics from Boltzmann and Gibbs amounted to successful reduction, but I would maintain that the opening of the field of thermodynamics, and the early successes resulting in the first and second laws were sparked by the failure of reduction.

Another example would be special relativity, which worked by proposing two postulates and drawing out their consequences, rather than by seeking any kind of reduction to a lower level of explanation to account for phenomena like the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction.

Your question reminds me of Einstein's distinction between principle theories and constructive theories. The examples I provided are instances of the former; principle theories operate by using overarching principles (like the relativity principle, the light postulate, or the laws of thermodynamics) to explain phenomena, generate predictions, etc., whereas constructive theories (like quantum mechanics or molecular genetics) try to build from the bottom up. Your observation might hold for constructive theories, but I would maintain that it fails for principle theories, and so we should not look to reduction as the one and only engine of new scientific knowledge.

I don’t think that you can say that one particular part of Boveri’s experiment was impressive, but that the experiment in its entirety was impressive. The number of fertilizations was huge but the sea urchin is able to lay millions of tiny eggs and fertilization occurs rapidly, making it a good species to study. The fact that he was able to piece all the data together by looking at photographs of mitosis is quite amazing. I did think that his experimental design was brilliant. It was brilliant that he chose the sea urchin because fertilization occurs outside of the body, making it easy to manipulate. Also, coming up with the idea to perform double fertilization to see how individual chromosomes uniquely impact development. If you had to say that one piece was most impressive, it would have to be the conclusion. This is because his experiment would lead to more experiments to learn about the abnormalities and further research on inheritance.

Molly's question: My question has to do with Dr. Wimsatt's paper Reductionism and its Heuristics, in particular centering around the role that heuristics play. Wimsatt writes that "[p]hilosophers start in the wrong place to understand most debates in the complex sciences, taking the levels of the reduced phenomena and reducing apparatus as givens." Is the same mistake made by the scientist as well? In other words, can the same be said to be true of curriculums taught to soon-to-be scientists? That is to say, it seems as though oftentimes in science, these reduced phenomena are heuristics that become the very things that are taught in lieu of an ontologically robust understanding. I am thinking for example, the concept of genes or the concept of an electron in a classical orbit model atom. (But perhaps I am simply confused?) If this is the case, can we say that heuristics have the potential to linger within theories, necessitating some sort of (for lack of a better term) extraction technique by either the philosopher or the scientist? And if not, is there realistic hope for both the scientist and the philosopher to in a sense 'keep track' of what particular kind of heuristic is being used, as well as reign in the effects that it may have on future questions that are born from models relying heavily on these heuristics?

I feel that I have less of an "answer" and more of a comment on your question. Mainly, if I am interpreting you question correctly, I find the same problem within the field of mathematics. I (and many mathematicians) see a large disconnect in the way that mathematics is being taught, even up through college, and what mathematicians are actually doing. Clearly this is not just a pedagogical issue, it is also a philosophical one. Also, this thought made me curious as to whether the problem that you identified applies to more fields than we are aware (being that we are all very segregated into our own specific areas).

Not all scientific theories are metaphysical theories. I would say that the theory of evolution, in particular, is not a metaphysical theory. It describes only what appears to be a contingent phenomenon in our particular world. True metaphysical theories describe much more fundamental, universal aspects of reality. That isn't to say that no scientific theories are metaphysical theories as well. Physical theories in particular (like quantum mechanics or string theory) are very often metaphysical; they propose an ontology and forces that govern the interactions between objects and other forces. While evolution does indeed describe reality, it is not metaphysical because it only applies in a specific scope. Metaphysics should not be so narrow. (Also, I believe that Wimsatt's critique of Kim is more a methodological one. But I struggled with the reading as well so that may not be the case.)

I would also be curious to hear what Prof. Wimsatt thinks are the similarities and differences between the goals of philosophy and science. Personally, I always understood philosophy as attempting to explain what science cannot. However, this perhaps becomes more complicated when philosophical questions are applied directly to the sciences.

My interpretation of Boveri's statement on chromosomal numbers is that he believed an organism could develop normally as long as it contained the minimal number of chromosomes which carry the essential qualities of that organism. Any additional number of chromosomes an organism possessed would be irrelevant until a maximum number is met and as a result errors would occur in development. This represents Boveri's idea that not all chromosomes are identical, and that each carries specific traits. If an organism contained these traits, I think Boveri believed it would develop normally. Alternatively, Boveri also recognized that even though a tripolar egg may contain the required minimal amount of chromosomes, it may not contain all of the essential qualities necessary for normal development and therefore wouldn't develop properly. This represents Boveri's idea that it's not the number of chromosomes that's important but the types of chromosomes present and the traits they possess. Of course, we now know that the specific number is important and can't go above an arbitrary number as Boveri believed. But his ideas on chromosomal uniqueness was correct and those ideas pioneered later studies in the field of genetics.

I found this question helpful for thinking about the relationship between what science actually knows from an experiment and what science things it knows from the results of an experiment. I agree with the assessment that Boveri’s conclusion provided by Moore—that the 36 chromosomes had a unique quality necessary for development—is incorrect. The evidence that Boveri complied only went to show that 36 chromosomes were necessary for development, but the specific qualities required for development could not have been deduced by Boveri.

As a scientist, I am very interested in trying to understand the connections between philosophy and science. From my perspective, the simplest way to define science’s goals is to say that science is the study of the natural world. Philosophy, on the other hand, is trying to explain the world as well, but in a much more abstract manner, regarding things and ideas that cannot be measured. They both share a desire of discovering the truth about the world. The most important similarity between the two I believe is in logical thinking, in even a very mathematical context. When one takes a course on Logic, it combines the components of both mathematics and philosophy.

I would say though, that the ultimate goals of science and philosophy are still quite different. The fundamental goal of any area of study is to better understand the world in a particular context. Historians attempt to understand the world based upon events that have occurred in the past by learning from previous examples. Sociologists strive to understand the world through society and culture. The goal of any area of study is to enhance our knowledge and perception of the world in a specific context, so we could say that every area of study has the same ultimate goal, but the more specific goals of each discipline are what define each area of study as unique and different.

This is an interesting question to me because I feel like you bring up an interesting point, which could have potential to find the meaning of a potentially important question. I personally believe that Roux did not suspect chromosomes were central to heredity, based on his readings. I think that this is simply something lost in translation.