Suez Crisis of 1956
The Suez Canal was a vital artery for European powers to maintain connections to their colonies and trade interests for many years. In July, 1956 Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser declares martial law in the canal zone and seizes control of the Anglo-Franco Suez Canal Company. Nasser's dramatic nationalization of the Suez Canal was not unprovoked, but in response to the British and American decision not to finance the construction of the Aswan Dam as a result of increased relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union. With the newly nationalized canal, Nasser estimated that the dam would be paid for within five years. With the new national control, Egypt blocked the passage of ships making port in or shipping out of Israel through the Suez Canal, coupling with his blockade of the Straits of Tiran--Israel's only outlet to the Red Sea--and Egyptian supported attacks by the Palestinians that further degraded Egyptian-Israeli relations.
The British were outraged by the Egyptian's audacity leading the conservative British Prime Minister Anthony Eden to push for punitive action against Nasser and thereby extinguish the spread of nationalism in the Arab world. The French, eager to stop the flow of military supplies to insurgents in Algeria, were ready for action alongside the British. Both countries feared that Egyptian control of the canal would lead to Western Europe being ostracized from vital petroleum reserves in the Persian Gulf. Three months after Suez nationalization, British, French, and Israeli leaders discuss the Protocol of Sèvres, a plan in which Israel would attack the Sinai desert pressing the Egyptians back to the canal. Once the fighting was within the canal zone, the British and French would declare Egypt too unstable to maintain the canal and, with help of the United Nations, take back the canal.
The invasions began in October, 1956; however, the canal was fully functional once more and therefore did not lend to the effectiveness and support of the action. with growing opposition both at home and within the UN, especially by the United States, the invasion--albeit a success--was a political folly. After the Soviet threat to intervene on behalf of Egypt, the U.S. put tremendous pressure on Israel, France, and Britain to move towards a cease-fire.
Europe sealed its fate in the aftermath of the conflict. The British and French lost any remaining influence in the Middle East while Nasser made tremendous political gains and was seen as a hero of Egyptian and Arab nationalism. Israel did not win freedom to use the canal, but the Straits of Tiran were opened. France also learned to distrust their allies more while Britain chose to increase ties to the United States. The conflict also coincided precisely with the Soviet military intervention in the Hungarian Revolution which both gave precedent to the Soviet intervention capabilities in addition to giving a justification to the Soviets for their invasive actions. Most importantly, with the failure of Britain and France to implement their policy without Soviet or U.S. approval, the Suez Crisis solidified the power shift from Europe to the two major superpowers.
Molly Burke
Eric DeVoe
Lauren Huus