The Best of All Possible Worlds

During a discussion in a Philosophy course this week on campus, several students saw fit to rail against the writings of Gottfried Leibniz, whom it is doubtful they have carefully read. The passage thrown carelessly before them and out of context, to defend itself alone, was that we reside in what Leibniz called "the best of all possible worlds". Immediately, the question came under fire by the students. How, one asked, does his assertion mesh with a situation like Hurricane Katrina? How could this be the "best of all possible worlds"? The consensus at the end of lecture was that "this world sucks on a regular basis, and God must be to blame, and either this ISN'T the best of all possible worlds, or else God can't create a perfect world."

Before I begin, I'd like to assert that criticism of analysis is no substitute for reading and critiquing primary source texts. If my analysis is flawed, I welcome constructive criticism of it. If you've a desire to criticize the ideas, take up the argument with the primary source text, not with me. For your time, you'll have a much larger impact by sticking to the principal texts of Leibniz and Cusanus.

There are several things which must be taken into account before one can truly appreciate Leibniz' argument. First, the argument is both an ontological and theological one. Leibniz believed in God. It's no secret. He didn't merely believe in God, but understood the existence of God to be a matter of metaphysical and ontological necessity, and his writings were almost certainly informed by the German Cardinal Nicholas Cusanus' "De Docta Ignorantia", which has been translated and published online by the University of Minnesota's Doctor Jasper Hopkins. Early in his career, Leibniz was a Cartesian (by his admission in his New Mechanics). However, he later would recant his Cartesian beliefs and publish a series of refutations on the metaphysical paradoxes inherent in Descartes' "Meditations". Among other things, Leibniz sought to dispel Descartes' Scholastic prejudice toward soul-body dualism.

Second, Leibniz' understanding of Deity differed from his British Empiricist counterparts in that he attributed three infinite qualities to Deity. In addition to the quality of "omnipotence" which the Empiricists agreed upon (and even wholly relied upon for the metaphysical underpinnings of their mechanics, as is shown in the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondences), Leibniz asserted the qualities of All-Wisdom and All-Goodness. This follows directly from the writings of the Florentine Cardinal Cusanus.

Leibniz' argument for all-wisdom proceeded something like this: if the laws which govern reality at any point contradict themselves, the entire system would be a paradox, and would not function. This creation were unbefitting a perfect Creator. Therefore, the laws which govern reality do not contradict themselves by implication or relation to each other. They are all seamlessly interjoined (example: sine and cosine). The creation of such a system require not only All-Power, but All-Wisdom as well.

For All-Goodness, Leibniz makes use of the metaphysical and ontological argument raised by Cardinal Cusanus, that Goodness must necessarily exist prior to the existence of Evil. An analogue of this argument can be shown as follows:

1. There are three types of logical statements:
2. Ones which include only true conditional statements.
3. Ones which include a mixture of true and false conditional statements.
4. Ones which include only false conditional statements.

If a logical sentence-part only contains true conditional statements, it resolves to true. For example, "IF a AND b AND NOT c" contains three sentence parts. "a", "b", and "NOT c" If all three of these resolve to TRUE, the statement as a whole resolves to true. If all or any of the conditional statements resolve to FALSE, the statement as a whole resolves to false.

Now, imagine that you have a logical statement with hundreds of millions of conditions. If even a single one of them resolves to FALSE, the entire statement is false. It only takes one. What does this mean?

It means that ultimately TRUE statements may only be composed of other true statements. On the other hand, ultimately FALSE statements may contain bits of truth and falsehood. The proportion of truth and falsehood, however, matters not at all. If even a single part of a statement, no matter how large, is false, the statement as a whole is ultimately false.

Truth, then, neither relies upon, nor admits of falsehood. In fact, truth demonstrably knows nothing of falsehood, for no true statement contains false parts. It is possible then, that truth existed prior to falsehood. Falsehood, on the other hand, is well acquainted with truth, and often admits of true parts (which themselves do not admit of false parts). It is not possible that falsehood could have existed prior to truth, since falsehood admits portions of truth in itself.

Since no other possibilities can possibly exist (there are no other combinations of truth an falsehood than those three above), we conclude that the only possibly true option is, in fact, a necessary truth. So many false statements can be shown to contain elements of truth, that we must acknowledge the metaphysical prioricity of truth to falsehood. This isn't a causal or temporal relationship, but one of metaphysical prioricity. Truth does not cause falsehood any more than unity causes number. And time, well time isn't a prerequisite to either truth OR falsehood, and we needn't trouble with it here. A similar argument is that one cannot admit of organic molecules existing prior to the existence of the carbon atom. One may not admit of atoms existing prior to the existence of electrons. Electrons are not made of atoms. Carbon atoms are not composed of organic molecules.

This argument is analogous to the one made for Good and Evil. Leibniz treats the question at great length in his "Theodicy", and Cusanus treats the question as well in his "De Docta Ignorantia". Their two accounts of this principle are harmonic. I will leave its exploration to the industry of the reader.

The end result is that Good exists, necessarily, prior to the existence of evil. And All-Goodness is a quality which is only possessed by God, for no other possibilities can claim axiomatic, ontological, metaphysical or any other form of prioricity. That which forms the basis for existence is All-Good then, in addition to being All-Wise and All-Powerful. This forms a trinity of principles which necessarily imply each other.

In Leibniz' view, then, a view he consistently promoted against the Empiricists, the laws which govern the universe do not contradict each other, since for them to do so would contradict the principles of All-Wisdom and All-Goodness, and relegate God to the image of the doddering old man on the mountain, Zeus, rather than the Triune described by Cusanus. Not only were an imperfect creation unbefitting an all-powerful Deity, but it would require that Deity constantly perform "miracles" to resolve the innate problems of the system. Think of Microsoft rolling out weekly patches to its operating system, and then raise the complexity to an infinite degree, and you'll have an idea of the tremendous amount of labor required. The empiricist Clarke promoted this view as proof of Deity's Omnipotence. Leibniz, however, promoted his alternative as proof of All-Goodness and All-Wisdom.

That alternative was that we live in the best of all possible worlds. He attributes the existence of evil not to Deity, but to "sin", or the necessarily innate imperfection of all finite beings. Deity is neither finite, nor a being, but being itself, or what Cusanus called both the "Absolute Maximum" and "Absolute Minimum", something beyond comparative relation. Leibniz argues that sin and evil are neither caused by God nor necessary in Creation, but merely permitted. Why are they permitted?

The answer is Free Will. It better befits the Glory of Deity that we human beings, who are permitted to choose good or evil for ourselves, can choose good. In fact, it were not possible for us to love in the absence of Free Will. We would be driven, as contemporary positivists and materialists, behavioral scientists and other unsound minds still hold we are, by mechanical necessity. Since the possibility exists that even a single person amongst us would choose to love what is good, and since that which is perfectly good is Deity, for Deity, Unity, Absolute Maximum, Absolute Minimum alone admits of no imperfection, the alternative--a mechanically certain universe, Leibniz argues, is not possible.

And if a world were possible which were better than this, the All-Wisdom and All-Goodness of Deity would again be in question. Such a world could certainly not be driven by mechanical necessity, for it were better that Free Will govern human action.

In other words, the evils we see in this world are attributable to ourselves alone. We alone choose our fates. We alone bring evil to ourselves. Deity offers the option of goodness, but we alone are free to choose it.

So, to return to the question of Hurricane Katrina. It is a manifestly evil thing that a population of human beings living in flood plain beneath sea level should direct such a large percentage of its daily attention and energy to the pursuit of entertainment and pleasure, when the scientific and industrial demands of the geographic location in which they reside are so great. In doing so, they fail to learn from millenia of history. Entire societies are regularly washed out to sea as a result of their own poor choices. It were better that they wash out to sea. It were BETTER STILL that they choose to know nature, to use their faculties and employ their labors toward the protection of their neighbors, their children, and their posterity. That sickness follows a poor diet is instructive and therefore good, and none may show that it, however unpleasant, is evil.

If Deity alone could have stopped the tragedy in New Orleans from taking place, then why are so many people upset with President George W. Bush? It is manifestly true that human foresight and right action could have prevented the flood from taking place. The Army Core of Engineers are certainly capable of building a system of Levees which are capable of withstanding hurricanes and floods of mythic proportions. The fault lies not in the laws of nature, nor in the power, wisdom or goodness of Deity, but in the Will of human beings.

We are more than capable of defending ourselves against the wind and the wave. That we failed to do so is our fault. The responsibility to protect ourselves and the neighbors upon whom we rely belongs to every person.

That pain and misery exist, that wars are fought, that sickness claims the lives of our loved ones, that we remain here on Earth when a universe awaits our footprints, all these things are the necessary results of our choices. And all of the evil that human beings can concoct and implement are overshadowed by the possibility that even a single one of us might love our Creator.