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November 30, 2006

Welcome Back, Purple Onion

The Purple Onion coffee shop, former home of many a recluse and midnight mathematician, is back online at their new location on 14th and University. I'd like to welcome them back with open arms. The new place looks quite a bit more spiffy than their former arrangement--which in truth was a few years overdue for incineration. We didn't call it the "Grungy Bunion" for nothing. I look forward to seeing the old crowd there on weekends and evenings--Joe with his Loeb editions, Baraki and his underappreciated poetic fervor, and various other displaced forces in the Dinkytown culture. You know who you are, O venerable fixtures of style and grit.

A cafe like the Purple Onion glues a community together in a way no Potbelly's could ever hope to do. Other places, like the Starlight and Espresso Royale did their best to catch the overflow, but the last days of the old Onion really were a high water mark in the culture of Dinkytown. Hopefully the new location will foster a fresh spin on the old haunt, that grizzled battleship, elder matron of dressed-down haute couture.

November 20, 2006

Final and Lasting Freedom from Cartesian Skepticism

Descartes fails in his “MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY” to establish a method whereby his opinions, as well as those of his readers, can possibly be demolished. The method he employs in his attempt to establish doubt in our senses does not achieve his stated goal, specifically to “go straight for the basic principles on which all [his] former beliefs rested” (p.76). Descartes' method for establishing the possibility for doubt, far from accomplishing his end, only succeeds in entangling itself and illustrating its inability to even possibly accomplish that goal.

In his “FIRST MEDITATION”, Descartes' first of three stages of doubt relates specifically to the trust of his senses. He reasons that "from time to time . . . the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once." In other words, if we are lied to by a person and fooled by our trust in their lies, then we should refrain from completely trusting this individual in the future, in case their words are untruthful.

An example of this is when we trust the time shown by a broken or unwound clock. It might be early morning, but the clock might indicate mid-afternoon. Once we know that the clock is deficient, we should never completely trust its reports on the time. From this Descartes resolves never to trust his sensory perceptions, and sets about the task of building a framework for doubt in all of his senses.

This first stage of skepticism or doubt anticipates the two which follow in that it establishes the possibility for suspicion in and consequent disregard for all information coming from our senses. It differs from the latter two in that it eliminates sense-certainty only with regards to size and distance, and basic comparative judgments made about objects which we perceive. It does not provide for the possibility, for example, of ruling out the existence of hands and feet, the existence of our immediate surroundings, the existence and identity of basic colors, the existence or function of simple and composite mathematical principles, or any other information which is subject to the careful scrutiny of our senses. Possible means by which we might cast those other matters under suspicion are provided in the two subsequent stages of doubt, namely "Dream Skepticism" and "Malicious Demon Skepticism".

One may easily respond to the first of Descartes' three stages of doubt by distinguishing between necessary and contingent truths. Descartes' assertion that "it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once" (p.76) does not necessitate that it is prudent always to completely distrust those who have deceived us even once. His method of complete distrust in all sense perceptions therefore must not necessarily follow from this assertion. From time to time, we know with absolute certainty the maxim that "even a stopped clock tells the right time twice a day." If we interject the a priori axiom never to trust the stopped clock, then the exercise of distrust itself becomes the source of deception "from time to time", and if we are to remain consistent with Descartes' method, can itself never be completely trusted and should be done away with.

This necessarily unwinds the utility of his entire method and not only the assertions, but also the course and conclusions of his argument. The subsequent two stages of doubt fall prey to the very same paradox. The dreamer may experience a hybrid of dream-senses and waking-senses, and as has been shown, some of the latter may possibly be true, such as pain from recent dental surgery that is constantly with the dreamer in their sleeping state. No doubt in dreamt-senses may therefore ever be described as necessary. Doubt here again is only possibly justified. Since, once again, doubt itself sometimes can deceive us, we must never completely trust it if we are to remain consistent with Descartes' earlier reasonings. Even were our senses nothing more than illusions owing their existence to the machinations of a malicious demon, we cannot by this method know that all of our senses must necessarily be illusory. We once again know that they may only possibly be illusory. Since doubt therefore exists about the scope of the demon's phantasm, consistency with Descartes' earlier reasoning demands that our doubt in our senses must never be completely trusted.

We therefore arrive at the end of the first meditation no more or less certain about any matter, nor any more or less ignorant about any matter. Descartes has not proven the necessity of doubt, only provided for its possibility. And if his argument in favor of the use of doubt is to be trusted, it illustrates only that his argument in favor of the use of doubt cannot be trusted. The method of doubt, therefore, cannot possibly demolish our earlier opinions or free us from them.

Descartes might respond to this paradox by determining that it were somewhat better for him to begin not with doubt, nor dream, nor the invocation of malicious demons to assist his reasoning, but to establish possible truths as he has done here, and then to examine with discipline their implications, in each step determining whether or not his assertions can possibly contradict themselves, and if so, what factors might contribute to his blindness. I would agree with his amended method, for it is true both that ultimately false statements may contain elements of truth, and that ultimately true statements may not contain elements of falsehood.

Descartes' method fails to distinguish between necessary and contingent truths, and in doing so confuses the possibility for doubt in one's senses with the necessity of doing so. In recognizing this, the reader may easily free themselves from the shadow of Cartesian Skepticism and regard the state of confusion and doubt in which he concludes the end of his first meditation as unjustifiable. His assertion “never to trust completely” (p.76) in no way necessitates “always to distrust completely”, which is the basis of his method. If this argument for complete distrust is applied consistently, Descartes' method is either false from the onset, or self-contradictory and paradoxical by its implications. The method, then, is by itself necessarily not capable of establishing even the possibility for doubt. Consequently, Descartes fails in his “MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY” to establish a method whereby his opinions, as well as those of his readers, can possibly be demolished.

November 19, 2006

Contraction and Protraction in Philosophy

My philosophical investigations have revealed to me the concept of contraction, or contracted representation of information. These can be understood in comparision with abstraction and protraction which are themselves distinct. Today I mean to clarify what I mean by "contraction" and "protraction", and the distinction between them.

I will do this by examining various representations of an action vector. In the image below, an action pathway is represented by interlocking grey and white fields. The perimeter of the interior grey field is the fractal, or "recursively self-similar" action. I mean action in the sense of that transitory state of being which would arise from moving an infinitely precise laser along the boundary between the two colored fields.

Observe the action pathway in its entirety:

fractal_contraction_unity.gif

The image above shows an abstract view of the fractal action in its entirety. This represents the entire field of possible actions. Sensing the intricacies of detail in the action pathway, we select a small internal portion of the whole:

fractal_contraction_unity.gif

We next isolate this portion of the whole and show it by itself below:

fractal_contraction_01.gif

This image is a selection, a portion of the unity above. If we examine this very same image file more carefully, by expanding its width and height by a factor of 13, we notice a distinct lack of resolution:

fractal_contraction_01.gif

This close examination reveals to us that the small image we have considered previously is not at all clear, it is actually a rather careful optical illusion of clarity which purports to represent the action described above, but in truth is no more than a grid of colored boxes which reveal no more detail when subjected to closer examination. This is the nature of our present medium, which is the Graphics Image Format (GIF) file type. The GIF images do not store in memory any further information about this particular mathematical action, except that necessary to present the above likeness. However, in the original program, a great deal of memory is expended in storing the data represented in each particular vantage point.

The program used to create the original abstract image, however, is not limited to this contraction or compression of data. Using the very same selection in the fractal viewer, we are able to protract, or magnify the selection:

fractal_protraction_01.gif

This is a protracted, or amplified portrayal of the same selection. It is not derived in any way from the pixelated selection above, but is a protracted representation of the same part of the original fractal action. The selection above had been contracted to a GIF image format, which explicitly and necessarily results in loss of data. This data loss is clearly shown when we expand the width and height as above.

The contraction of data in this manner is necessary, given the nature of its own manifold of representation, which is an electronic portrayal of the original fractal vector. Because of the finite resolution of computer displays, all visual representations are contractions necessarily--computer displays can represent at maximum 72 dpi, or "dots per inch" of data. The GIF algorithm is useful precisely because, through contraction, it dispenses with all data except that needed to portay a recognizeable likeness of an original, more protracted signification. This reduces the size of the "memory footprint" of each image, allowing faster data delivery over the Internet. Given the infinite complexity of the fractal vector, the size of the image file could scale infinitely, far outstripping the physical limitations of the computer hardware.

The fractal browser is not limited to the size constraints imposed by the Internet, and can allocate a large sum of memory to recording data about the fractal action pathway. This means that the representation of the fractal signifies a much greater resolution of information. The information present in this high-fidelity portrayal is "contracted" into the GIF format. Conversely, the information present in each small portion of the GIF format is "protracted" or magnified in the fractal viewer.

The process detailed above continues further "down" into the fractal. We can isolate another selection from our last vantage point:

fractal_selection_02.gif

Which we show here:

fractal_contraction_02.gif

This GIF image, upon closer examination, is itself a contraction of the original action vector:

fractal_contraction_02.gif

The pixelation shown in this close examination of the GIF is a contraction of the following, protracted signification:

fractal_protraction_02.gif

We can see clearly here the relationship between contraction and protraction. It is important to note that computers can not protract an image, thereby increasing the resolution of that image and the amount of clarity or data which is stored in the image. This is shown frequently in popular films, but has no basis in reality. Compression is final for computers. Once they discard data, it is lost.

The human mind, however, does not suffer from this limitation. It freely contracts and protracts on a regular basis. Language is no less a contraction of meaning than the above images were contractions of an action pathway. However, the mind can "reconstitute" language, protracting it in order to derive the original meaning of its author, with varying degrees of success.

Another way to think about contraction and protraction is as a projection screen. If you were to project the image of a circle upon a flat, curved, and textured surface, you would get three different visual representations or contractions of the original, protracted form. Similarly, if you print a circle with varying qualities of equipment and material, ranging from dot matrix on green paper to color laserjet on glossy card stock, you get varying contractions of the original action. An action may be contracted multiple times, each time reducing the clarity or somehow distorting the original until it is no longer recognizeable by the mind.

In my own research, I have concluded that logic is a discrete and mechanized contraction of reason. Logical processes can not generate hypotheses as rational processes can. They are not able to resolve their own paradoxes or even prove all of their own axioms. They are severely limited in this regard. This is not to say that they do not have their uses. They may easily be automated, for example.

I suspect also that the mind is a manifold of action which admits certain contractions of truth, and that the nature of the mind admits of alterations which increase its resolution or expressive capacity, its ability to accurately reflect truth. This might be tied to our apparent ability to protract meaning from a contracted manifold.

I hope that my illustrations above help convey the meaning of my use of "contraction" and "protraction' as I continue my investigations. I will likely return to this entry several times in the future as an example of my meaning.

Please feel free to republish this document in its entirety, so long as proper attribution is given to its author. All fractal images were created with Tierazon and Photoshop CS2.

Enquiries on Contraction and Protraction in Philosophy

November 18, 2006

G.W. Leibniz: Philosophical Texts

Leibniz, Gottfried. Philosophical Texts. Trans. Richard Francks, and R.S. Woolhouse. New York: Oxford University Press. 1998. (ISBN: 0-19-875153)

This text is available for purchase at Amazon.com

Importance: Critical

Remarks

This is one of the most important texts in my collection. It should be required reading for all students of Philosophy. In his various treatises and correspondences, Leibniz introduces and defends his metaphysics of mind-body correspondence.

Texts Printed in this Edition

  1. Discourse on Metaphysics (1686)
  2. Correspondence with Arnauld (1686-1690)
  3. Reflections on the Advancement of True Metaphysics and particularly on the Nature of Substance Explained by Force (1694)
  4. New System of the Nature of Substances and their Communication, and of the Union which Exists between the Soul and the Body (1695)
  5. Specimen Dynamicum: An Essay in Dynamics
  6. Reply of M.S.F. to M. de L.B.Z. on his New System of the Communication between Substances (1695)
  7. Remarks on M. Foucher's Objections (1695)
  8. [First] Explanation of the New System of the Communication between Substances, in Reply to what was Said of it in the Journal for 12 September 1695 (1696)
  9. Extract from a Letter Written by M. Leibniz about his Philosophical Hypothesis (1696) ('Third Explanation of the New System')
  10. Note H to Bayle's Dictionary Article 'Rorarius' (1697)
  11. Leibniz's Comments on Note H to Bayle's Dictionary Article 'Rorarius' (1705?)
  12. A Letter . . . to the Editor, Containing and Explanation of the Difficulties which M. Bayle Found with the New System of the Union of the Soul and Body (1698)
  13. Nature Itself; or, The Inherent Force and Activity of Created Things--Confirming and Illustrating the Author's Dynamics (1698)
  14. Note L to Bayle's Dictionary Article 'Rorarius' (1702)
  15. Leibniz' Comments on Note L to Bayle's Dictionary Article 'Rorarius' (1705?)
  16. Reply to the Comments in the Second Edition of M. Bayle's Critical Dictionary, in the Article 'Rorarius', concerning the System of Pre-established Harmony (1702; published 1716)
  17. Draft Letters from Leibniz to Bayle (December 1702)
  18. Principles of Nature and Grace, based on Reason (1714)
  19. Monadology (1714)

November 17, 2006

Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range, and Resolution

Rescher, Nicholas. Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range, and Resolution. Open Court Publishing Company. Chicago and LaSalle, Illinois. 2001.

ISBN 0-8126-9437-6

This text is available for purchase at Amazon.com.

Remarks

This is a fine text, very useful for logicians and especially for the study of paradox in general, as well as in discontinuities and aporia which arise in logical and physical systems. Highly recommended for students of philosophy.
The views and opinions expressed in this page are strictly those of the page author. The contents of this page have not been reviewed or approved by the University of Minnesota.