Final and Lasting Freedom from Cartesian Skepticism

Descartes fails in his “MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY” to establish a method whereby his opinions, as well as those of his readers, can possibly be demolished. The method he employs in his attempt to establish doubt in our senses does not achieve his stated goal, specifically to “go straight for the basic principles on which all [his] former beliefs rested” (p.76). Descartes' method for establishing the possibility for doubt, far from accomplishing his end, only succeeds in entangling itself and illustrating its inability to even possibly accomplish that goal.

In his “FIRST MEDITATION”, Descartes' first of three stages of doubt relates specifically to the trust of his senses. He reasons that "from time to time . . . the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once." In other words, if we are lied to by a person and fooled by our trust in their lies, then we should refrain from completely trusting this individual in the future, in case their words are untruthful.

An example of this is when we trust the time shown by a broken or unwound clock. It might be early morning, but the clock might indicate mid-afternoon. Once we know that the clock is deficient, we should never completely trust its reports on the time. From this Descartes resolves never to trust his sensory perceptions, and sets about the task of building a framework for doubt in all of his senses.

This first stage of skepticism or doubt anticipates the two which follow in that it establishes the possibility for suspicion in and consequent disregard for all information coming from our senses. It differs from the latter two in that it eliminates sense-certainty only with regards to size and distance, and basic comparative judgments made about objects which we perceive. It does not provide for the possibility, for example, of ruling out the existence of hands and feet, the existence of our immediate surroundings, the existence and identity of basic colors, the existence or function of simple and composite mathematical principles, or any other information which is subject to the careful scrutiny of our senses. Possible means by which we might cast those other matters under suspicion are provided in the two subsequent stages of doubt, namely "Dream Skepticism" and "Malicious Demon Skepticism".

One may easily respond to the first of Descartes' three stages of doubt by distinguishing between necessary and contingent truths. Descartes' assertion that "it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once" (p.76) does not necessitate that it is prudent always to completely distrust those who have deceived us even once. His method of complete distrust in all sense perceptions therefore must not necessarily follow from this assertion. From time to time, we know with absolute certainty the maxim that "even a stopped clock tells the right time twice a day." If we interject the a priori axiom never to trust the stopped clock, then the exercise of distrust itself becomes the source of deception "from time to time", and if we are to remain consistent with Descartes' method, can itself never be completely trusted and should be done away with.

This necessarily unwinds the utility of his entire method and not only the assertions, but also the course and conclusions of his argument. The subsequent two stages of doubt fall prey to the very same paradox. The dreamer may experience a hybrid of dream-senses and waking-senses, and as has been shown, some of the latter may possibly be true, such as pain from recent dental surgery that is constantly with the dreamer in their sleeping state. No doubt in dreamt-senses may therefore ever be described as necessary. Doubt here again is only possibly justified. Since, once again, doubt itself sometimes can deceive us, we must never completely trust it if we are to remain consistent with Descartes' earlier reasonings. Even were our senses nothing more than illusions owing their existence to the machinations of a malicious demon, we cannot by this method know that all of our senses must necessarily be illusory. We once again know that they may only possibly be illusory. Since doubt therefore exists about the scope of the demon's phantasm, consistency with Descartes' earlier reasoning demands that our doubt in our senses must never be completely trusted.

We therefore arrive at the end of the first meditation no more or less certain about any matter, nor any more or less ignorant about any matter. Descartes has not proven the necessity of doubt, only provided for its possibility. And if his argument in favor of the use of doubt is to be trusted, it illustrates only that his argument in favor of the use of doubt cannot be trusted. The method of doubt, therefore, cannot possibly demolish our earlier opinions or free us from them.

Descartes might respond to this paradox by determining that it were somewhat better for him to begin not with doubt, nor dream, nor the invocation of malicious demons to assist his reasoning, but to establish possible truths as he has done here, and then to examine with discipline their implications, in each step determining whether or not his assertions can possibly contradict themselves, and if so, what factors might contribute to his blindness. I would agree with his amended method, for it is true both that ultimately false statements may contain elements of truth, and that ultimately true statements may not contain elements of falsehood.

Descartes' method fails to distinguish between necessary and contingent truths, and in doing so confuses the possibility for doubt in one's senses with the necessity of doing so. In recognizing this, the reader may easily free themselves from the shadow of Cartesian Skepticism and regard the state of confusion and doubt in which he concludes the end of his first meditation as unjustifiable. His assertion “never to trust completely” (p.76) in no way necessitates “always to distrust completely”, which is the basis of his method. If this argument for complete distrust is applied consistently, Descartes' method is either false from the onset, or self-contradictory and paradoxical by its implications. The method, then, is by itself necessarily not capable of establishing even the possibility for doubt. Consequently, Descartes fails in his “MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY” to establish a method whereby his opinions, as well as those of his readers, can possibly be demolished.