CLA: Sociology Workshop Series

Since the workshop, I have been thinking about potential reasons for general non-acceptance of atheists in American public and private life. Three possibilities come to mind and I thought I'd throw them out to see if there is any reaction to them.

First I wonder if atheists are just on the next frontier of pluralistic religious acceptance. Over the history of our country it seems that acceptance has gradually expanded (my denomination --> Protestants --> Christians --> Judeo-Christians --> monotheists --> other religious). Though the progression outlined above is not complete, it seems likely that it will continue in this direction. Atheists may not be accepted because they are even farther out on the continuum. This acceptance may come in time.

Another reason for possible non-acceptance was alluded to in yesterday's discussion. It might stem from the fact that people have very little direct or indirect experience with atheists and almost all indirect experience is likely negative. People tend to have more experience with the comparative groups, if not directly, at least indirectly through media, etc. Though familiarity often leads to contempt, I think it is also true that there are positive portrayals of the comparative groups in our culture. This might lead some to say, though I don't like "X" group in general, I know there are some "good ones" out there who could be a good president or who could be good for my son/daughter. In sum, it seems easier to have strong negative feeling about a group that I have no personal experience with and that is nearly always associated with negative actions.

I hesitate to make my final point because it is based on the premise a book that I have not yet read, Its on my reading list for the up-coming break.) but here goes. In Moral, Believing Animals, Christian Smith revisits the age old argument that humans are fundamentally moral and believing. If this sense is at the core of our humanity (or taught to us as such), would this not explain the reaction to a group of people who are perceived has having no beliefs (at least not in a supernatural power) and no sense of moral authority?

SO MUCH FOR THE CULTURAL TOLERANCE...

In his New Left Review (2005, Number 34 July-August) article "Against Human Rights" Slavoj Zizek writes as follows. "The problem of pseudo-choice also demonstrates the limitations of the standard liberal attitude towards Muslim women who wear the veil: acceptable if it is their own free choice rather than imposed on them by husbands or family. However, the moment a woman dons the veil as the result of personal choice, its meaning changes completely: it is no longer a sign of belonging to the Muslim community, but an expression of idiosyncratic individuality.
In other words, a choice is always a meta-choice, a choice of the modality of the choice itself: it is only the woman who does not choose to wear a veil that effectively chooses a choice. This is why, in our secular liberal democracies, people who maintain a substantial religious allegiance are in a subordinate position: their faith is ‘tolerated’ as their own personal choice, but the moment they present it publicly as what it is for them—a matter of substantial belonging—they stand accused of ‘fundamentalism’. Plainly, the ‘subject of free choice’, in the ‘tolerant’, multicultural sense, can only emerge as the result of an extremely violent process of being uprooted from one’s particular life-world."

Does this same logic apply to atheism? Is it, too, a result of process of being uprooted from one's life-world? Who is not subordinated?

SO MUCH FOR THE CULTURAL TOLERANCE...

In his New Left Review (2005, Number 34 July-August) article "Against Human Rights" Slavoj Zizek writes as follows. "The problem of pseudo-choice also demonstrates the limitations of the standard liberal attitude towards Muslim women who wear the veil: acceptable if it is their own free choice rather than imposed on them by husbands or family. However, the moment a woman dons the veil as the result of personal choice, its meaning changes completely: it is no longer a sign of belonging to the Muslim community, but an expression of idiosyncratic individuality.
In other words, a choice is always a meta-choice, a choice of the modality of the choice itself: it is only the woman who does not choose to wear a veil that effectively chooses a choice. This is why, in our secular liberal democracies, people who maintain a substantial religious allegiance are in a subordinate position: their faith is ‘tolerated’ as their own personal choice, but the moment they present it publicly as what it is for them—a matter of substantial belonging—they stand accused of ‘fundamentalism’. Plainly, the ‘subject of free choice’, in the ‘tolerant’, multicultural sense, can only emerge as the result of an extremely violent process of being uprooted from one’s particular life-world."

Does this same logic apply to atheism? Is it, too, a result of process of being uprooted from one's life-world? Who is not subordinated?