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June 25, 2009

Making Sense of the 2009 Iranian Elections

In this guest web log, Dr. Khali Dokhanchi (UWS) writes: The presidential election of 2009 is perhaps the most devastating development to the Iranian regime since the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Most people assumed that the next crisis in Iran would be "external"--namely a military attack on its nuclear installations either by the US or Israel. No one expected that the regime in Iran would nurture the seeds of its own destruction. Irrespective of truth about how many people voted and who they voted for, people who felt that the elections were "rigged" took to the streets to demonstrate their unwillingness to continue with the status quo. What are we supposed to learn from these events? What do they mean?

First, the Iranian electorate is alive and attentive. Eight years of punditry on how we need to export democracy to the Middle East left us with the impression that the people of Middle East were passive sheep that take whatever is meted out to them by their repressive regimes, and they needed the "Westerners" to guide them to the democratic promised land. The pictures of old and young, man and woman, dying, being beaten or detained for their rights, once and for all, end the debate about the passivity of the electorate. Within the limited confines of what is granted to them in terms of rights, they will claim and use their rights.

Second, the demands of the protesters are very specific. The protesters are concerned about having their votes counted and, given questions regarding the legitimacy of the "results," call for a re-election. The fact that they are seeking their rights as specified by the Iranian Government made their campaign far more effective and robust. They point to violations of election laws and merely seek to remedy those violations.

Third, the dispute is about elections and not democracy. Unfortunately for Iranian protesters, that battle for democracy was lost even before the election. There are rather restrictive election rules that often disqualify candidates from running for office, and in a way, the elections are predetermined in Iran. What makes the 2009 election interesting is that despite "pruning" the list of nominees who could run for office, the handling of the voting and subsequent release of "official" results raised a number of questions about the legitimacy of the count. The battle is not between "Islamic hardliners" and "democrats" but hardcore "Islamists" and lite "Islamists". The so-called reformers are very much products of the Islamic Revolution. Iran did have a reformist regime from 1997 to 2005 and there is no indication that if the reformist returns to power, their rule would be any different than that of ex-president Khatami. Namely, they will pass legislation to bring Iran closer to the international community, only to have the rules overturned by one of the semi-elected institutions. The only area of improvement is in the social area, namely the government will back off its "morality police" rule and allow the people to do what they want in the country and give them a bit of "breathing" room. The idea that reformers coming to power will solve some of the problems that Western countries have with Iran is merely wishful thinking.

Fourth, the protesters have already achieved a couple of enormously important objectives. The Iranian regime now knows that the voters are fully aware of their rights and will protect them. Future elections in Iran will be closely monitored, and they will have less room to control these elections. More importantly, however, the crisis highlighted the role of the "Supreme Leader." Oddly, most of the rhetoric of the protesters is not directed at Ahmadinejad but Khamenei. Frequent references to the Khamenei as the "dictator" are a clear personal and institutional challenge to him and to his office. The fact that demonstrations occurred even after he forbid it means a lot in terms of his power and legitimacy in the future. The fractured ruling elite is the necessary first step for change in Iran.

Fifth, the current situation had provided the seeds for future changes in Iran. The strategic choices of the protesters as well as their nonviolent means provide them with a wonderful tool for political change in the future. Failure of the political regime in Iran to satisfy the needs of the protesters may lead these people to articulate more demands and more serious changes to the current system in Iran. Only then, may true democracy emerge in Iran.

June 8, 2009

The UK political crisis

The transformation from economic downturn to political crisis started slowly enough. At first the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown was a ‘hero’ in the way that he took action to secure the banking system and seek international agreement. But a strange little time bomb was ticking away inside Parliament, the question of MPs’ expenses, and when the details went public, the electorate turned nasty. This gave it a specific emotional focus for a whole set of issues. Gordon Brown has been on the back foot ever since, even although the expenses are a matter for the Speaker’s Office and not for the government. The Speaker has already paid the price and has gone. One blow after another has landed upon Brown: Ministerial resignations, defeat in the local government and European elections. The crisis has two elements: a lack of confidence in Parliament, in the House of Commons in particular, and a slow ebbing away of authority from the Government of the day. What has gone wrong?

Parliament has a number of problems and these problems interact. MPs are not paid enough and have tried to increase their remuneration by manipulation of the expenses system. Most of them have to maintain two homes, one in their constituencies and one in London where house prices and rentals are hugely inflated. Whilst some of the manipulations of the system have been culpable, few have been grossly venal. Nonetheless less, in a recession, the electorate has fixed on this as evidence of those in authority looking after number one. This is not the time to say out loud that MPs are not paid enough to do a good job in scrutinizing government.

There are too many MPs. This has come about in a number of ways. Devolution has reduced the volume of government business coming from Wales and, more especially, Scotland. Scotland is over-represented at Westminster. Even in England, constituencies are of varying sizes and fewer representatives would be appropriate. The fact of the EU has also changed the nature of business. Have fewer MPs, pay them more and give them the resources to undertake the sort of research that would make Parliamentary Committees a more effective means of scrutinizing the executive. These ideas are around but they are unlikely to be pushed until the present mood passes. Voters are simply angry and have expressed their anger at the polls.

Under normal circumstances, the Parliamentary whips are too strong. The Scottish Parliament is elected on a proportional basis, Westminster on a first-past-the –post. Scotland, once a Labour fiefdom, is learning to use the new system effectively. The Westminster system requires strong parties and party discipline is carried out by the whips. The Prime Minister controls a vast amount of patronage and can use this to guarantee support, even in a crisis such as Brown is facing. Power, under normal circumstances, has deserted the Commons and will only return if MPs count on a more independent basis. Giving them resources is one thing (this will help) but changing the underlying power-relations probably requires a change in the voting system. Under proportional representation the Commons would return to life.

The end of a government, and make no mistake, we are witnessing the dying throws of Labour in power, tends to come quickly as power unravels one strand at a time. Brown is in this position at the moment. He is faced with a very cross electorate, upset with the present performance of government and with the political institutions themselves. he is also faced with a restless Parliamentary party. This crisis is not just one of policies but of underlying problems requiring radical constitutional change. Brown is not capable of recovering. He can call an election quickly and put the government and country out of its misery or he can linger on till the bitter end. If this was the approaching end of a Tory government, he would already be gone and a new leader in place but the Parliamentary Labour party does not know which way to jump.