1. Foucault first describes a panopticon as a prison with special architectural features. On the outside there is a circular building, and in the middle there is a tower. The circular, outside building is made up of cells. These cells have two windows: one facing the tower and one to let the light in. The tower in the center is also lined with windows. This type of prison, Foucault argues, accomplishes a new type of order because the supervisor in the center tower can see everything. Foucault likens the cells to small theaters where each individual is individualized and constantly visible. Order in a panopticon is established because visibility is a trap. Essentially, because the tower supervisor is able to see the inmates at all times and the inmates are not capable of knowing if they are looking, the inmates are forced to behave. In short, the panopticon provides power that is visible and unverifiable. The inmate can always visibly see the dark outline of the center tower, but he never knows when he is being watched. The first thing that comes to mind when applying the panopticon concept to every day life today is traffic law. The police force in the United States has striven to seem omnipresent by patrolling around cities in their patrol cars. Civilians, then, have the impression a policeman is around every corner. Because of this center tower of power, people are less likely to commit traffic violations especially in towns or cities. The intersection cameras recently being added by the government also add to this panopticon effect on the driving habits of others. Though this may not be a perfect parallel to Foucault's prison panopticon allusion, I feel the enforcement of traffic law does have some similarities. Another example I thought of is simply every action a person makes in public. You would never do something in appropriate in a public place in fear someone was watching you. There isn't necessarily a punishment or disciplinary action from this type of panopticon power, but I suppose the power of society to shun someone for doing something inappropriate is a strong punishment within itself.
3. Foucoult explains that the accumulation of men and the accumulation of capital cannot be separated. I understood this as the emergence of disciplinary power and the emergence of power happened simultaneously and both influenced each other. The growth of power and accumulation of men could not continue without an economy that could sustain and use them. The growth of capital and industries, though, could not continue without disciplinary power to sustain production. On one hand, disciplinary power provided unity to the newly multiplicity of society. It also provided efficiency for production of capital. It provided a way to ensure each worker of a company was being utilized to its fullest using the least amount of time and resources. On the other hand, the growth of a capitalistic economy gave rise to a specific culture in which disciplinary power could be used. The way in which factories and other institutions were laid out in an early capitalistic economy provided the perfect environment for disciplinary power to thrive. In short, the emergence of disciplinary power and the emergence of capitalism were directly related. "Each makes the other possible and necessary; each provides a model for the other" (214).
March 2012 Archives
In Truth and Power Foucault offers a commentary on power, and he questions the idea of speaking of power as simply repressive and negative. What example of power does he offer to show that power isn't merely negative and repressive?
• In truth and Power reading, Foucault makes a commentary on questions asked regarding power. For his discussion, Foucault discussed the notion of repressive and ideology in the same category of question asked regarding Marxist phenomenology. According to Foucault, the notion of repression is an insidious one. Meaning that it corresponds on the effects of power when he wrote the "Madness and Civilization". He differently thinks now that the notion of repression as the productive aspect of power. For example, Foucault asserts that an individual adapts to a power with a law which says no. To that extent, power is taken as it producing the force of prohibition. According to Foucault, if power weren't repressive, there would not be anyone to obey it and follow with its laws. Not only that power produces laws that say no which sounds negatively to the civilians of a country or the proletariats who are the working class but according to Foucault, "It traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, and lastly power produces discourse" (Foucault 203). Additionally, Foucault suggests that power should be well thought-out as productive network which runs through the social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression (203). In other words, Foucault is affirming us that we shouldn't look at the negativity more like the repression side of it but rather we should give credit to the larger picture of it. The positive side that power perpetuates is more like the things such peace, harmony, inducement of pleasure but not always looking at it as repressive. An example of repression that Foucault affirmed is how the concept of repression is used a relation to sexuality. He uses example of how bourgeois society repressed sexuality. For example, " The campaign launched against masturbation in the eighteenth century, or the medical discourse on homosexuality in the second half of the nineteenth century or discourse on sexuality in general, one does seem to be faced with a discourse of repression" (Foucault 204). Ultimately, Foucault brings up a point of why the western world has insisted for so long on seeing the power it exercises as juridical and negative rather than as technical and positive? I have dissimilar example of my own parent's motherland. My parents are originally from the horn of Africa Somali "east Africa". Back in 1977, there was a war between Somali and Ethiopia. Somali had won that war back then but since then the two governments and the civilians had been rival to each other "hate-rish among themselves". Approximately five years ago, there was an interim government in Somali fighting against warlords. The interim government had asked help from the neighboring country Ethiopia for their troops "soldiers" so that they could help clear out the warlords. The Ethiopian soldiers landed in Somali to help the interim government for bringing peace. From what I heard, the Ethiopians had raped the women in the course of bringing peace to Somali. The government came up with a repression laws against the civilians. The civilians were thinking what the Ethiopian troops "soldiers" were doing as a revenge of the 1977 war. In pursuit of bringing peace, they killed the men, raped the women with the power they had. So, the connection I am trying to make here to the Foucault arguments of that power having more than to do with the repression it comes with; is that the civilians of Somali looked the aid of the Ethiopian troops as negative impact sort of revenge thing which is the repression "Negative" but they didn't looked at the positive of side of it which was bringing peace back.
In The History of Sexuality, Foucault describes how the sovereign (whether a monarch, state, or other authority-wielding body) has evolved over time from wielding a power over death to a power over life. In the past, the state was a moderating, restraining force. It controlled by suppression, and exercised itself through the taking of lives. Life was a precarious situation, and survival had to be ensured through cooperation. It was the sovereign's job to eliminate those who threatened survival.
The transition to power over life occurred around the time when technology advanced enough for people to look beyond the bare fact of survival and examine the quality of life. When people ceased worrying about being alive and began worrying about living, the state's job became the promotion of life itself. The right to kill became contradictory and was phased out; thus, most governments no longer practice a death penalty and war has taken a drastic connotation. Instead governments fight for life through "anatomo-politics of the human body" and "bio-politics of the population" (193). Governments have become "a power whose highest function [is] no longer to kill, but to invest life through and through" (194). This is evidenced through modern programs such as public schooling and public works.
I believe Foucault has a very good point. I can clearly see that the goal of political power is the promotion of life. Everything our government stands for (life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness) is about life. The right to kill has become quite scarce. Even when we wage war, it is no longer for the purpose of eliminating a certain group of people, but for restoring peace to or protecting the lives of a group of people. The results may be the same, but the motive is different. Thus, the Crusades were about seizing the holy lands from unworthy peoples; about waging war *against* them. The conflict in the Middle East today is about protecting the liberties of oppressed civilians and reducing the risk of genocide.
On the other hand, this focus on life does not seem universal. I feel that some sovereign authorities still wield a power over death. I am by no means an expert, but I know that the Yazidi people still practice stoning as a means of social control. This is not about preserving a quality of life; it is about the survival of a culture.
I would also imagine that power over death versus life exists on a spectrum correlated with modernization, since Foucault claimed the transition from the one to the other was related to modern technological advances.
I experience sovereign power in my life every day. As an individual, I feel the state's efforts toward anatomo-politics strongly. I have gone through 12 years of public education provided by the state. I have grown up with the state's ideas on how to manage my health, analyze history, do math, drive, etcetera. All of these things have helped optimize my individual potential. As a member of populations, I have felt the state's power more indirectly. I have received state-mandated vaccinations, followed laws concerning food safety and safe driving, and benefitted from federal efforts to eliminate diseases such as polio and hoof and mouth disease. In these cases, I am part of a population-level effort to increase vitality.
1. What is a panopticon? How did the panopticon accomplish a new kind of order, according to Foucault? Can you think of some contemporary examples of the panoptic form in other areas of life besides prisons?
A panopticon is an architectural structure that consists of a central tower looking down on a series of cells surrounding it. The cells are well lit with a window in the front and the back, allowing light to pass through, but also not allowing interaction with the person in the cell next to it. The central tower is structured in away that the person inside can see clearly into all of the surrounding cells, but not of the people in the cells can see into the tower. The purpose of this is to always keep the prisoner/ student/worker guessing as to when they are being watched or supervised, hence they will continually behave well and do their work. "Power is visible, but unverifiable." This architectural structure is different from a normal cell, where the prisoner is kept in the dark, unable to see anything or anyone. The point of the original prison cell is isolation, lack of sunlight, cut off from pretty much everything. So, you can see that this is vastly different from the panopticon structure, where the emphasis is on keeping the prisoner well lit so he can be seen at all times. Focault describes this as a very important and powerful structure. It eliminates the peer pressure, the social forces that are involved in things like religion, school, society in general, and causes people to only be concerned with themselves. Focault also describes the genius of the fact that the mechanism can be operated by anybody, even a man's servants. The fact that the operator cannot be seen makes this possible. He also states that having random people come to the tower to observe and punish the occupants enhances the structures effectiveness. Having random people come in with different ideas of what should be punished or perhaps someone that just gets pleasure out of punishing prisoners, keeps the cell occupants on their toes and makes them feel even more powerless. An example I can think of is the interrogation rooms in a police station. The one way glass window allows the police officers to watch a suspect and analyze his behavior while the suspect cannot see through the glass in the observation room. Another example I thought of was anywhere that has security cameras, be it in a store, a parking ramp, an elevator, hallway, etc. When you see a camera and think someone is watching, you behave better and perhaps would be less likely to break the rules or laws. A third example I thought if was when an empty squad car is parked next to the road. Since you aren't able to see inside the car from any distance, everyone slows down and obeys traffic laws. As soon as everyone can see that the car is empty, they speed up again. Hence, when they think someone's watching they behave, and when they find out there's no one there, they act however they want. In my opinion, I think this would be a very effective mode of control and punishment. Nothing is more frightening that the unknown, and never knowing when you're being watched would definitely keep me in line. The lack of privacy would make me feel powerless as well, in a sense giving the "abuser" more power over me.
Foucault - Means of Correct Training SP 2012.pdf
Here is a downloadable copy of the additional reading required from Foucault, "Means of Correct Training," excerpted from Discipline and Punish.
Michel Foucault II - Disciplinary Society and Biopower: Reading Questions
"Discipline and Punish" in Contemporary Theory - Michel Foucault
1. What is a panopticon? How did the panopticon accomplish a new kind of order, according to Foucault? Can you think of some contemporary examples of the panoptic form in other areas of life besides prisons?
2. What is Foucault's concept of "discipline"-- How is it different from other forms of power? Why, according to Foucault did "discipline" emerge as a major mode of power and governance? What are the three principles by which the techniques of discipline work (211-212)?
3. How was the growth of capitalism connected to the emergence of disciplinary power? (213-214).
"The Means of Correct Training" (excerpt from Discipline and Punish) - Michel Foucault
1. Explain Foucault's concepts of "hierarchical observation" and "normalizing judgment." How were these processes central to the exercise of disciplinary power?
2. Outline the "five distinct operations" of disciplinary power. Describe how each technique works to discipline bodies, and give examples.
1. When Granovetter discusses the oversocialized view of human action he is referring to a life in which the behavior of people is controlled by the opinions of others. People who are oversocialized are controlled by what are considered the norms and values of society. These people do exactly what is "expected" of them. An example of this would be those people who are "destined" for lower level jobs are trained to be dependable followers of rules, and those people who are expected to be in elite job or career positions attend four year colleges. In each example, the specific type of person is being socialized in a way that would best suit someone in the position they anticipate being in for the rest of their lives. They are overly controlled by social norms.
The view of human action as undersocialized is that it is based on self-interest. At least that is how I understood it. People who are undersocialized are less influenced by societal norms and values than are their oversocialized counterparts. People may initially act in an undersocialized manner, but will eventually shift to a more oversocialized form of action as they feel the daily pressures of society's norms and expectations being pushed on them from every direction. In society, people are expected to follow the social norms that structure our loves. Like the example above, certain people are expected to attend college while others are expected to take on training and consequently jobs that are dependent on following rules and obedience. If a person who was expected to be the latter type of individual ends up going to college and becoming a successful businessman (or businesswoman), it is considered a great success story because that individual is doing the unexpected. On the other hand, if a person who is expected to go to college and be one of those successful business people ends up not going to college, that person is often considered to have been unsuccessful in their life. If someone who is expected to go to college does go to college and does exactly what is expected of him (or her), there is nothing out of the norm here. Most people are not exceptionally impressed or disappointed. It is just the norm created by society. This is what occurs in oversocialized human action.
Granovetter views the idea of actions as embedded as more accurate because he says you cannot construe behavior as strictly independent because the immense social relations that are experienced on a daily basis. There is more to human action than just oversocialization and undersocialization. There is a sort of combination of the two. He says culture is not a once for all influence but an ongoing process. Culture not only shapes its members bur is also shaped by them. So, oversocialization cannot be the right answer because culture is not just shaping the individual. However, undersocialization cannot be the right answer either because culture is not just shaped by the individual. So, we come to a combination of the two with embeddedness.; culture being shaped by individuals and also shaping them in the process.
What are the three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change, according to DiMaggio and Powell, and how are they different? In other words, what are three situations that they suggest lead to institutions "copying" one another, and why? How are these examples of institutional isomorphism different from competitive isomorphism?
According to DiMaggio and Powel, the three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change are "(1) coercive isomorphism that stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy; (2) mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty; and (3) normative isomorphism, associated with professionalization." (149).
Coercive isomorphism occurs when an institute feels the need to act in a specific way or they could be punished. This punishment can occur formally or informally and is applied by other organizations. An example would be applying a change within an organization due to a new mandate from the government. When Obama was first elected, there was discussion on vehicles having to meet specific requirements for gas mileage while on the road. Had this been implemented, all organizations which sell vehicles would need to ensure their vehicles would meet the requirements set forth. If not, there would have been a punishment by utilizing a higher tax.
Mimetic isomorphism is different from coercive isomorphism in the fact it is a behavior which occurs naturally when responding to doubt, its sole basis is on uncertainty. "Not all institutional isomorphism, however, derives from coercive authority. Uncertainty is also a powerful force that encourages imitation." (151). For example if a new law firm is being established in an area, and they are uncertain on how to operate. They could emulate another local law firm that seems to be legitimate and successful. Thus the new law firm is 'mimicking' the other local law firm.
Normative isomorphism differs from the other two because it is the result of professionalization of institutions and result in change. "...we interpret professionalization as the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work to control "the production of producers" and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy" (152-153). DiMaggio and Powel go on to say there are two important aspects. Once is the formal education and the second is growth and amplification of social networks. An example can be seen from dentistry. Although dentist offices compete with one another for patients, the main interest is the medical staff to be accredited within institutions. So, it can be seen that dentist professionals across the nation are trained similarly and are more likely to follow similar procedures regardless of the location of the dentist office.
The difference between the institutional isomorphism and competitive isomorphism "...assuming a system rationality that emphasizes market competition, niche change, and fitness measures" (149). DiMaggio and Powell did not see competitive isomorphism presenting an adequate idea for the "modern world of organizations" (149). In this sense, it would mean organizations would work in an open aggressive market, whereas institutional isomorphism has certain conditions pertaining to the organization who seek "political power and institutional legitimacy" (149). So DiMaggio and Powell believe Institutional isomorphism can better relate to understanding the organizations within modern society.
DiMaggio and Powell revisit Max Weber's classic idea of the Iron Cage of Capitalism. While they pay homage to his ideas, stating that the need for efficiency for economic gain began the start of bureaucracy, and in fact drove a great deal of its increase and do believe it has taken on a life of its own, outside of the religious and cultural temperature in which it began (i.e. ascetism and Protestantism and the industrial revolution). However, DiMaggio and Powell differ greatly from Weber in one important way: They believe that it is no longer a drive for efficiency that spreads bureaucracy, but a desire for homogenization. They believe that this shift to homogeneity does not necessitate that the changes be for more efficiency. The rationalization of society, they say, comes from the state and professions, which are set up similarly to each other because of organizational structures. The state dictates certain laws and organizational structures, which every new unit in the population must submit to in order to abide by customs and laws. Efficiency is no longer the center of the iron cage, it is sameness and predictability.
The main way in which this homogenization takes place, according to DiMaggio and Powell, is through isomorphism--organizational structures constrain institutions to resemble each other when they are faced with the same/similar situations. They tend to do this in three different ways: coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and normative isomorphism.
Coercive isomorphism is enacted when political forces tend to constrain an institution to behave a certain way, either through legal or extra-legal methods. Because institutions in a society share a common legal environment (they all must obey the same laws, deal with citizens who must obey the same laws, etc.), they are required to follow certain guidelines and honor their commitments in a certain way. Eventually, even if an institution sets out to differentiate itself from other organizations, the legal environment will demand that it acts in similar ways to the institutions around it by dictating how they interact with individuals and other institutions.
Institutions tend to model themselves after other institutions that have "succeeded" already, because they have overcome similar problems and found legitimate and useful ways to deal with uncertain situations. This natural reaction to uncertainty is termed by DiMaggio and Powell as mimetic isomorphism. The original institution may in fact have no desire to be modeled, and the newer institution may not necessarily want to model itself after another, but when a new situation presents itself and an institution does not know how to deal with it, it automatically grasps at what has already been done (and done successfully) to confront the situation. "New organizations are modeled upon old ones... and managers actively seek models on which to build" (152), is the statement that best describes mimetic isomorphism.
The third type of isomorphism is normative isomorphism, which dictates that a given society has certain expectations from certain types of institutions, and when an individual enters a certain type of institution they bring those expectations into it. For instance, a doctor who has gone through many years of schooling has been taught that doctors are given a certain salary and treated with a certain amount of respect, even if they enter their profession in a different hospital than they trained at. As a result, the organization of hospitals looks mostly the same even in very different areas, because the individuals build them up as so.
The three types of isomorphism described above fall into DiMaggio and Powell's category of institutional isomorphism, which describes mostly politics and customs of modern life, while competitive isomorphism describes more of Weber's idea of rationalization: the need to sell the cheaper product to out-do one's competition drives rationalization through efficiency.
According to Mark Granovetter there are two polar or extreme views of human actions. On the one side it is a human action that is characterized by "nudersocialization". It means that people act with no regard to the relationships between each other and are solely driven by self-interest and rationality. It is a utilitarian approach to human action. This view suggests that "people of the same trade seldom meet together..." . On the other hand there is a human action that is "oversocialized", meaning that people act driven by social influence. That people are very sensitive to the opinions of others. They become obedient to norms and traditions. They get socialized and instead of following rational self-interest they automatically follow habits, customs and norms.
Nevertheless, since social relations are always present, Granovetter suggests that interpretation of human actions or institutions could not be made by construing it as independent entities. He suggested that human actions are constrained by social relations and are embedded in it.
Granovetter suggested that people also could be opportunistic in their self-interest, meaning that they can be "self-interest seeking with guile". The concept of self-interest included force and fraud in terms of economic relations. Here comes the issue of trust. How people can trust each other? From utilitarian point of view a person who cannot be trusted would not have an opportunity for economic relations and malfeasance becomes costly. Also, there is a substitute of trust in a form of contracts. Also he argues that there is a concept of general morality that keeps things in order. People developed certain regard for others that is essential for survival.
But, what the author argues, differs his theory from others is that every action is embedded in social relationships, and social relations produce trust. People involved in relations and relations generate trust that discourages malfeasance. So, better or stronger relationships, more trust is generated and less malfeasance is present.
However, Granovetter also suggests that strong trusting relationships enhance opportunities for malfeasance. Embezzlement would be an example of a malfeasance that involves an abuse of trust.
So, Granovetter argues that people are not driven solely by self-interest, but their interests are imbedded in social relations. Instead of having under- or oversocialized human actions there are social relations that guide social actions either more over- or more undersocialized.
In their turn DiMaggio and Powel suggest that institutions become isomorphic due to relations between each other. They paraphrase Schelling that states that organizations in a structured field respond to an environment that consists of the responses of other organizations to the environment, so it is a relation between responses (p. 148). Institutions mimic each other, they coerce each other to become like them. Normative pressure includes collective struggle. Even if chance happens not due to relationship, it is still due to the influence from outside and not because of pure self-interest. So, both theories suggest that people act in response to somebody else, which implies relations between people or institutions.
2. What are the three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change, according to DiMaggio and Powell, and how are they different? In other words, what are three situations that they suggest lead to institutions "copying" one another, and why? How are these examples of institutional isomorphism different from competitive isomorphism?
The three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change are, coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism and normative isomorphism. "Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations function" (150). The pressure to change may be due to political influence as well as problems of legitimacy, which institutions may feel as force, such as government mandate, or persuasion. DiMaggio and Powell provide examples of institutions that adopt changes to conform to external standards. These examples include changing pollution control technologies to satisfy new environmental regulations, as well as adopting changes within an organization to meet tax law requirements.
Mimetic isomorphism is based on uncertainty. Uncertainty within an institution encourages imitation. "When organizational technologies are poorly understood (March and Olsen, 1976), when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on other organizations" (151). This is different from coercive isomorphism because the latter feels external pressures to implement changes within its institutions. Mimetic isomorphism on the other hand, encourages changes within its organizations, in order to make its practices more effective. These organizations can then model themselves after similar organizations that may be more legitimate and successful, in hopes that the implemented changes enhance their legitimacy and express their desire to improve the conditions of the organization to other organizations.
Normative isomorphism then refers to professional pressures that instigate changes. These professional pressures, or professionalization, are the collective struggles of an occupations members to ultimately control the production of producers. Through normative isomorphism, organizations are able to ensure the best individuals become members of specific occupations. This isomorphism encourages the filtering of personnel. "Within many organizational fields filtering occurs through the hiring of individuals from firms within the same industry; through the recruitment of fast-track staff from a narrow range of training institutions; through common promotion practices, such as always hiring top executives from financial or legal departments; and from skill-level requirements for particular jobs" (153). As a result of professionalization, organizations attempt to only allow those with exceptional qualities as members of their organization. These organizations hope that by having only the best of the best, they can build legitimacy with other organizations in the same field. This is different from coercive isomorphism because normative pressures are felt from within an organization, to establish not only employment standards, but also value standards. In this sense it is more similar to mimetic isomorphism, but mimetic isomorphism seeks improve itself by modeling its own organization after another. Normative isomorphism then is primarily driven by professional pressures to establish legitimacy is the individuals that organizations employ rather than the structure or practices of organizations.
Institutional isomorphism is different from competitive isomorphism, because these changes serve to enhance the internal efficiency of organizations. The goal of institutional isomorphic change is to establish similarities between organizations, rather than establish a status competition between organizations. "This similarity can make it easier for organizations to transact with other organizations, to attract career-minded staff, to be acknowledged as legitimate and reputable, and to fit into administrative categories that define eligibility for public and private grants and contracts" (155). Although competition may exist between organizations, the primary goal is to establish efficiency within individual organizations as well as in the relations between organizations in the same field.
In "Economic Embeddedness," Mark Granovetter is arguing that neither the "oversocialized" view nor the "undersocialized" view of human action is accurate.
An "oversocialized" view of human action asserts that all human action is caused by socialization. Essentially, people listen to and obey the previously developed set of norms and values until the "obedience is not perceived as a burden" (163). According to this school of thought, social influence is an external force and mechanical. Once a person is born into a certain social class the rest of their behavior is automatic.
On the other hand, an "undersocialized" view of human action argues that no social interaction or social relations have any affect on production, distribution, or consumption. In this school of thought, when applied to economics, argues no person "noticeably influences aggregate supply or demand" (163). Under an idealized competitive market, there is no need for bargaining or any need for prolonged human or social contact between buying parties. In the real world, believers of the "undersocialized" view of human action believe free market competition creates a system of maintaining order than personal traders cannot produce themselves. In a competitive market, if traders are encountering the malfeasance of other traders, they can simply move on to another set of traders that are willing to do business in a trusting manner. In this view of social action, social relationships are seen to be frictional. In the end, social action is caused by self-interest.
Granovetter does not believe either of these views of social action completely encapsulates the reality of social action. He believes his theory of embeddedness is much more fitting. The basis of his theory rests on the behaviors of people and institutions being constrained by ongoing social relations. The importance of social relations is the main reason Granovetter rejects both the "oversocialized" and the "undersocialized" view of social action. To him, social relations play little importance in both of these views. These views, he argues, are driven by atomized actors. First, in the "oversocialized" view, action is driven externally by previously established social value and norms. Second, in the "undersocialized" view, action is driven by self-interest. Granovetter further argues that these two views merge and intersect. Though people may act in their own interest "undersocialized," the source of other social functions is left open to social norms and values, which is really an "oversocialized" view.
Granovetter wants to avoid any view that involves atomization. He feels that no one behaves outside a social context. Instead, actions are "embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations." If economists ever do consider social relations as key to action, they strip away any social context from those relations. They take away the history and interpersonal ties between the relations and simplify the interactions down to people playing specific role positions and role sets. Therefore, the person is atomized by the role they are ascribed. No individual content or social context is even considered. Though attempting to consider social relations, economists are really again just atomizing economic action. To Granovetter, this is a travesty as "ongoing systems of social relations" is the core of all economic action.
2. DiMaggio and Powell define isomorphism as a process of interaction that forces one thing to resemble another or other things that face the same conditions. This leads to the homogenization of things as being similar in nature. For example, organizations try to resemble more successful organization of the same status hoping to be as successful if not more successful. According to DiMaggio and Powell, the three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change are coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and normative isomorphism.
"Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations function" (150). To extend on that quote, DiMaggio and Powell are saying that coercive isomorphism occurs when an organization exerts pressure on another organization which depends on them. This dependency can be economic or the companies may be bound by contract. This pressure can be applied in the forms of force, persuasion, or policies. For example, government uses policies or sanctions to keep companies in check as a form of coercive isomorphism.
Mimetic isomorphism is basically the imitation of another as a result of uncertainty, or sometimes failure. Organizations can model themselves on the basics of other organizations when they feel that they can't reach their goals or their goals are ambiguous. The modeled organization is sometimes unaware that it is being copied. It is only a source of information that the borrowing organization uses. This can happen through employee transfer, trade between organizations etc... The authors use the example of Japan's efforts to modernize by copying by studying different aspects of American and European systems of education, and economy and in turn implementing it in their own society.
DiMaggio and Powell stress that homogeneity stems from the fact that new organizations are modeled upon old ones throughout the economy (152). They are arguing that organizations model themselves after similar organizations that they perceive to be successful. Basically, I think their argument is that the economy drives this concept of isomorphism.
Normative isomorphism derives from "professionalization as the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work" (152). There are two features of professionalization which DiMaggio and Powell say are important to isomorphism. One is education in a university, and second, the growth and expansion of professional networks that create new models. This creates a group of professionals or individuals who hold similar positions in organizations, and process the same ideas which may "shape organizational behavior" (153). Again this homogenizes diverse organizations and this is the point that DiMaggio and Powell are trying to make through isomorphism.
Institutional isomorphism differs from competitive isomorphism in the sense that the latter emphasizes more on "market competition, niche change, and fitness measures" (149). Basically homogeneity is does not exist and according to DiMaggio and Powell, free competition exists among organizations.
In regards to the first question addressing this reading: As was mentioned in both the reading "The Iron Cage Revisited" and "The Protestant ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism," Max Weber explains that rationalization was brought on by asceticism and creates its own sort of whirl wind which captivates and locks in society under capitalism. The imprisonment of this sort of society is what has been referred to as the "iron cage." Going one step further, Weber explained that the organizational result of rationalization is bureaucracy and once bureaucracy became prevalent, that whirl wind would keep society locked in, leaving no escape. Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell state Weber's three related causes of bureaucracy, placing extra emphasis on the competitive marketplace.
DiMaggio and Powell explain their beliefs that the causes of bureaucracy and rationalization have changed and are different from that of Weber's. They explain that now competition and efficiency are less of the driving force behind the changes in organizations. Rather, these changes are resulting from the "process that make[s] organizations more similar without necessarily making them more efficient" (147). The structuration of organizational fields, DiMaggio and Powell argue, are actually the motivation behind bureaucratization and homogenization. They identified the "rationalizers" as the government and businessmen/women that affect the process of the structuration of organizational fields.
DiMaggio and Powell believe that organizations and institutions tend to look very similar today. Their reasoning for this phenomena are stated when they explain that "individual efforts to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint often lead, in the aggregate, to homogeneity in structure, culture and output" (147). To clarify, in the beginning stages, institutions and organizations seek diversity in hopes of standing out and being noticed for those differences that set them apart from other organizations and institutions. However, once that field becomes better known and established, the strain towards homogenization becomes unbearable. This process places great emphasis on the notions of connectedness and structural equivalence. The structuration or process of institutional definition includes the following four components: "an increase in the extent of interaction among organizations in the field; the emergence of sharply defined interorganizational structures of domination and patterns of coalition; an increase in the information load with which organizations in a field must contend; and the development of a mutual awareness among participants in a set of organizations that they are involved in a common enterprise" (148).
After the institution or organization has been established and structured into an existing field, they are forced into being similar. In the long run, the people in charge of making the rational changes create an environment that disables their growth in the future. In other words, organizations desire change and strive for it constantly, but after they reach that peak in structuration of an organizational field, the opposite occurs and they are forced to cut back on diversity and changes within the field. The organizations that have been around the longest and are of greatest magnitude are those that reach the peak and then are able to control it by dominating the environment that encompasses them rather than adjusting to them. Isomorphism is the concept that most accurately captures the process of homogenization. In regards to isomorphism, "at the population level, such an approach suggests that organizational characteristics are modified in the direction of increasing compatibility with environmental characteristics; the number of organizations in a population is a function of environmental carrying capacity; and the diversity of organizational forms is isomorphic to environmental diversity" (149). Isomorphism is broken down into two categories: competitive and institutional.
--Lindsay Florin
1. DiMaggio and Powell begin their paper describing Weber's analysis of rationalization and bureaucratization. How do you they think their perspective on changes in institutional structure is different from Weber's? Why do they think institutions tend to look so similar today?
-DiMaggio and Powell seem to theorize that structural change in organizations seem to be driven more by how they strive to become more and more similar to other organizations within the institutional structure. This can be compared to Weber's theory, which suggested that bureaucratization and other forms of organizational change are driven by competition among organizations or the need for efficiency. To Weber, the Iron Cage trapped us under bureaucratization and rationalization to become machine like to make everything we do be efficient in nature. To D&P, I feel that they take the Iron Cage metaphor another step further. If we become these machine like creatures with one common goal (efficiency), this will already be so normatively established that it will no longer be questioned. Competition is no longer necessary, as we grow into homogeneous organizations much like others. Once organizational fields have been established, they are pushed to become more and more alike. These fields then become so normatively sanctioned that this increases the likelihood that these institutions will continue to adopt the same kinds of norms and values that already preexist, and this is why they think institutions tend to look so similar today.
2. What are the three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change, according to DiMaggio and Powell, and how are they different? In other words, what are three situations that they suggest lead to institutions "copying" one another, and why? How are these examples of institutional isomorphism different from competitive isomorphism?
-The three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change include coercive isomorphism, mimetic processes and normative pressures. Coercive isomorphism occurs when there is a large influence put on organizations depending on certain cultural expectations in society. This influence is based on pressures regarding how certain organizations should function. This might occur when there is a certain force or persuasion to run an organization differently to live up to certain laws or rules enforced by government policies or the like. In this light, many similar organizations would tend to be structured similarly or start to resemble each other based on rules and regulations they need to abide by. Mimetic processes involves modeling other organizations, who may already be similar, when they adopt different successful tactics, policies, etc . from these organizations. This might occur because one organization is uncertain of their own ways of running it, so they imitate another in hopes of being as successful. This might happen from employees suggesting different things they may have seen while working with a different organization or heard by word of mouth. However it occurs, there is an extent as to how much different organizations mimic each other. In normative pressures, the professionals or leaders of organizations tend to have similar traits and ways of carrying out how the organization will thrive. Many professionals within the organization were trained in much of the same way as their competitors were trained, like education backgrounds and qualifications. I believe that these mechanisms of institutional isomorphism differ from competitive isomorphism because it is not how organizations 'weed out' methods of gaining advantage over other competitors, but how many organizations tend to end up operating in similar ways altogether. Institutional isomorphism is how organizations tend to start to look similar in many aspects, while competitive isomorphism looks at how these organizations compare each other in what the best way is to come out on top.
1. Weber viewed bureaucratization as a means by which to control individuals. He saw it as an iron cage where the bureaucracy made it impossible for individualism or creativity to survive, in effect imprisoning individuals. He argued for the irreversibility of bureaucracy based on its efficiency and power of control. However, since Weber wrote, the growth and change in bureaucracy cause DiMaggio and Powel to view it in a different light. They believe that the causes (as Weber saw them: competition among capitalist firms in the marketplace, competition among states, and bourgeois demands for equal protection under the law) of bureaucratization have changed. Instead of structural changes being driven by competition or need for efficiency, DiMaggio and Powell see these changes driven by processes that make organizations more alike - not necessarily more efficient as they state. The authors contend that bureaucratization comes from the ever-developing structure of organizational fields.
DiMaggio and Powell set out to explain the uniformity, not variation, of organizational forms. They look at the totality of relevant factors in answering this question. They note that when an organizational field is initially established there is much variation, but over the course of its life, sees a push towards homogenization. The authors note that after an organization is structurally defined, "powerful forces emerge that lead them to become more similar to one another" (148). The sameness comes from the fact that as organizations develop, they create environments that constrain future movement. As organizations try to develop and change, a time will come when the developed structure of the organization will lead to the totality of individual change lessening the extent of diversity in the field. The organization has the power to control the environment instead of adapt to it. DiMaggio and Powell seek to explain this phenomenon with the term 'isomorphism.' They define isomorphism as "a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions." They go further to suggest two different kinds of isomorphism. Competitive isomorphism is more closely related to Weber's views of competition driving early innovation. Institutional isomorphism is the idea that the major factor organizations have to take into account is other organizations.
2. Coercive isomorphic change deals with pressure from other organizations. These pressures can be formal or informal. In addition, coercive isomorphism results deals with the changing in cultures surrounding an organization. Mimetic isomorphic change happens when there is uncertainty. When an organization is having trouble defining itself, identifying with an environment, or labeling goals the organization is likely to mimic other organizations (most often similar or more legitimate/successful.) Normative isomorphic change comes from professionalization. "Professionalization is the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work, to control 'the production of producers,' and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy." These institutional types of isomorphism differ from competitive isomorphism because although institutional isomorphism is in part driven by other organizations, it is not driven by the competition between the organizations, but rather different aspects interactions with each other.
1. DiMaggio and Powell begin their paper describing Weber's analysis of rationalization and bureaucratization. How do you they think their perspective on changes in institutional structure is different from Weber's? Why do they think institutions tend to look so similar today?
DiMaggio and Powell argue that their view is different from Weber's theory by claiming that the bureaucratization of the corporations and the state have already been achieved. They argue that the world has become filled with increasingly homogeneous organizations, and they study the variations in structure and technology within the organizations. DiMaggio and Powell note that as organizations go through the stages of their life cycles, they lose their diversity--as they become more established, they lose their diversity. The two sociologists claim that as new ideas spread, there's a limit to the benefits of adopting those ideas. The ideas are adopted for the sake of having the ideas and fitting in with the other organizations rather than any practical need. As a result, the environment of organizations becomes one in which one organization responds to the responses of other organizations, which are only responding to yet another response of yet another organization. This is happening because of four things: there's more interaction between organizations now, strongly defined inter-organizational patterns of coalition, an increase in the information load, and a developing awareness of competition among organizations. These things have been increasing steadily over time, which creates a more homogeneous environment for orginizations.
2. What are the three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change, according to DiMaggio and Powell, and how are they different? In other words, what are three situations that they suggest lead to institutions "copying" one another, and why? How are these examples of institutional isomorphism different from competitive isomorphism?
According to DiMaggio and Powell, there are three mechanisms which spark institutional isomorphic change. These are coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and normative isomorphism. In different situations, these mechanisms will cause change. Coercive isomorphism comes from an organization under political pressure, or adjusting to seem legitimate within the environment. The organizations are pressured by cultural expectations in their societies. Mimetic isomorphism is simply a change made as a response to an uncertain environmental factor. Normative isomorphism may have an external force require change within an organization, stating that the change is necessary for professional reasons. For these mechanisms, the motivation to change is so that the organizations will conform with the other organizations within their environment. Competitive isomorphism is different from institutional isomorphism in that with competitive, some organizations will copy the ones that are more successful. It's the same idea of organizations adapting to one another for success, but with competitive isomorphism, some organizations don't just imitate and conform, they rather directly copy a more successful rival.
In Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell's paper, "The Iron Cage Revisited", they start off by discussing Max Weber's analysis of rationalization and bureaucratization. DiMaggio and Powell state that the causes of bureaucratization and rationalization have been altered. As the world grows and organizations become more and more alike DiMaggio and Powell claim that these "Organizations are still becoming more homogeneous and bureaucracy remains the common organizational form." (P. 147). This is on account of a concept that DiMaggio and Powell utilize called Isomorphism. Isomorphism, according to DiMaggio and Powell, is a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions." (P. 149). Isomorphism comes in three mechanisms, Coercive, Mimetic and Normative. Coercive stems from political influence and issues of legitimacy. Mimetic deals with standard responses to uncertainty and ambiguity. Normative focuses on professionalism. This helps to understand why there is developing homogeneity of organizations as proposed by DiMaggio and Powell.
The changes along with isomorphism and these organizations are becoming more and more alike, but as claimed by DiMaggio and Powell, the focus of efficiency is not how Max Weber would have analyzed it in society. Weber believed that Bureaucracy would be the new way of the future and that by working in this manner, one of rational-legal authority and power, it would bring about more efficient means. Weber conveyed that social institutions were dependent of each other and that Bureaucratic structures and arrangements focused more on efficiency as opposed to DiMaggio and Powell's claim that organizations. It seems that these theorists share a similar view on the bureaucratization and rationalization but the ends that each one perceives are slightly different from each other's thoughts. Weber sees organizations utilized to be more efficient while DiMaggio and Powell see that organizations in society are becoming more homogenized or similar to each other.
In modern times, in accordance with DiMaggio and Powell, social institutions and organizations tend to look similar or more homogenized because of isomorphic change, especially by way of Mimetic isomorphism. For example there are organizations with the same environmental conditions such as McDonalds, Burger King, etc. Burger King is having more success than McDonalds lately and in order to enhance their legitimacy, to demonstrate they are at least trying to improve working." (P. 152). Most times there is uncertainty and that is where Mimetic isomorphism is at its strongest. Sometimes even, organizations use "Modeling", for a response to the uncertainty which in the long run create an even more homogenized social institution because organizational systems are copied or mimicked or "adopted". This is why DiMaggio and Powell see institutions now days as more homogenized.
1. On pp. 162-165, Granovetter discusses an "undersocialized" view of human action, and an "oversocialized" view of human action. What does he mean when he says a view of human action is "oversocialized" or "undersocialized"? Why does he think that a view of social action as "embedded" is a more accurate description?
Granoverter describes "oversocialized" view of human action as a development of social norms and values that influence people into their social actions. People make decisions depending on how others would perceive those decisions. They basically depend on others to make their decisions for them. There is a "natural thing to do" or a right and a wrong so people "oversocialize" their decisions based on those rights and wrongs. It has a lot to do with someone's social class whether they make certain decisions based on what others would think. People with low job levels tend to follow the rules more while people destined for higher education tend to progress to the next level of rules. Whereas "undersocialized" view of human action is different. This is saying the human influence is not an effect of any production, consumer, or distribution of products. People's decisions are not dependent on what others think and what others expect. They only base their decisions on themselves and do not associate with society very much. This is because people do not want their products to be the same as competitors. You want to up the others so you have to be different and not depend on others opinions of the product you are producing. People do not meet with their competitors in order to produce things that are the same. You want to be different from each other. Granoverter shows in his text that "oversocialized" and "undersocialized" do have some things in common. Their actions and decisions are carried out by their actors. "Undersocialized" is carried on by the self-interest and the "oversocialized" is carried on by behavioral patterns and ongoing social relations have an effect on behavior. He talks about how people will go from undersocialization to oversocialization because they surrender their powers and want to behave in an honorable manner. Since there are two different ways to view human action, people are able to change their view. The individual has social influences in their head so there could be different rules for everybody. People do not have a written script telling them how they should act and telling them what to do, instead they are embedded by society. They are not forced to act a certain way but society makes them believe that a certain way is the right way. Society has certain norms for all circumstances that happen in a person's life and people do not need to follow them but they are expected to. They grow up learning certain ways of life so if they act differently than others then they are not normal. The norms are in an individual's head whether they want them there or not. These actions have been embedded in our minds our whole lives and have an effect on how individual's act. People can either "oversocialize" or "undersocialize" their action. Many actions are mechanical because of society's view on them. A person's social class and their labor depend on whether they oversocialize rather than undersocialize although many other factors contribute to it also.
In Truth and Power Foucault offers a commentary on power, and he questions the idea of speaking of power as simply repressive and negative. What example of power does he offer to show that power isn't merely negative and repressive?
In Truth and Power Foucault criticizes the French Communist Party and of Marxist ideas in general (base/superstructure, etc.), particularly in their reference to power. Why?
In the History of Sexuality Foucault writes about "power over life". What is "power over life"? Do you agree with Foucault that this is how power manifests itself today? Can you feel its influence in your own life?
<"The Iron Cage Revisited" - Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell>
1. DiMaggio and Powell begin their paper describing Weber's analysis of rationalization and bureaucratization. In the text book, "Contemporary Sociological Theory", DiMaggio and Powell argue that "the causes of bureaucratization and rationalization have changed." (147). Namely, they assert that "Organizations are still becoming more homogeneous and bureaucracy remains the common organizational form." (147). In addition, the authors point out that structural change in organizations and bureaucratic systems are "less and less driven by competition or by the need for efficiency." (147). This is different from what Weber argues. To be specific, Weber asserts that the organizations and bureaucratic systems seek to increase efficiency and this process is led by the competitive marketplace. However, DiMaggio and Powell explain that "bureaucratization and other forms of organizational change occur as the result of processes that make organizations more similar..." (147). Thus, they focus on being similar to other forms rather than just being efficient. Therefore, I think this perspective on changes in institutional structure is different from Weber's perspective.
DiMaggio and Powell explain the concept of isomorphism as the process of homogenization of organizations. According to the text book, isomorphism refers to the process that make one in the group or population resemble others that facing the same environmental circumstances. Based on this concept, they explain that "after a certain point in the structuration of an organizational field, the aggregate effect of individual change is to lessen the extent of diversity within the field." (148). Namely, an organization or institution is trying to be similar to other organizations or institutions, because it wants to adopt the certain environmental conditions. Therefore, an adoption which could be "powerful forces that lead organizations to become more similar to one another" (148). That is why I think institutions tend to look similar today, based on DiMaggio and Powell's perspective.
In terms of adoption, being similar to one another could be a responding process between organizations and their surrounding environments. To be specific, Organizations react and respond to their environmental circumstance that other organizations respond as well and the environmental circumstance respond to organizations. The reason why the they try to fit the environment is to achieve economic fitness, political power and institutional legitimacy. Therefore, In organizational field, decision makers are trying to make the best decision for surviving, thus they might "select" similar option which lead them to fit the environment. "They argue that isomorphism can result because nonoptimal forms are selected out of a population of organizations or because organizational decision makers learn appropriate responses and adjust their behavior accordingly." (149).
"The Iron Cage Revisited" - Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell
1. DiMaggio and Powell begin their paper describing Weber's analysis of rationalization and bureaucratization. How do you they think their perspective on changes in institutional structure is different from Weber's? Why do they think institutions tend to look so similar today?
2. What are the three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change, according to DiMaggio and Powell, and how are they different? In other words, what are three situations that they suggest lead to institutions "copying" one another, and why? How are these examples of institutional isomorphism different from competitive isomorphism?
"Economic Embeddedness" - Mark Granovetter
1. On pp. 162-165, Granovetter discusses an "undersocialized" view of human action, and an "oversocialized" view of human action. What does he mean when he says a view of human action is "oversocialized" or "undersocialized"? Why does he think that a view of social action as "embedded" is a more accurate description?
2. In Granovetter's discussion on trust and malfeasance (pp. 166-169), how does he explain both social order and deviance (disorder)? How does he think his analysis of social order is different from past theorists?
3. Overall, how do both (DiMaggio/Powell and Granovetter) theorists' analyses of institutions challenge the notion that people act purely out of economic self-interest?
1. Describe the "continuum of roles" one might play in life, according to Goffman. What does it mean to be "sincere" vs. being a "cynic?" Give your own examples of someone on either end of the continuum, then use your example to illustrate how someone might alter their belief in the role they play over time.
In this reading, Goffman uses the analogy of life being a stage and the people in it being actors. Different actors take their roles more seriously than others, some totally believing in the role that they play and some are just putting on a show. This is what Goffman means by the "continuum of roles". At one end are the "sincere" actors who are totally consumed by there roles and are as convinced of their role as the audience is. An example that comes to mind is a high school teenager. They partake in the fashions and language that the other children use so they can be "cool" an impress the popular kids. By partaking in this behavior, they become to believe that they are cool and trendy. At the other end of the continuum are the "cynics". These actors are only putting on an act for some kind of ulterior motive, such as for the benefit of the audience, though some "cynics" have no concern for their audiences beliefs and some might even get pleasure from "tricking" their audience into believing their act. An example of a "cynic" could be a patients at a mental hospital. When they have visitors, they feel the need to act out in fits so their visitors wouldn't be disappointed with a "sane performance". Goffman also discusses that these acts we put on are like masks we put on. These masks may represent a person that we want to be, such as using the fine china and dressing better when having a dinner guest. The person might want to look more upper class or make their upper class guest feel more comfortable. It is possible for the actor to change his view from "sincere" to "cynic" and vice versa over time. An example would be a person moving from the country to a large city. They start dressing trendier and going to coffee shops, trying to act as if they weren't from a different type of society. They want everyone to believe that they are a "city person" as well and soon enough, they will start to believe that they actually are as trendy and urban as they were acting before. A persons' act can also go the other way on the continuum, from sincere to cynic. The example of someone in a religious context such as a preacher is used in the text. At first, the actor is absolutely convinced of what he is preaching and believes every words that he says as he would have his audience believe. But, as time passes, he may start to see holes in his beliefs and slowly start to realize that he has doubts about his sermons. But for the sake of his congregation, he continues the mask. Goffman explains that the roles that we strive to fill, the masks that we wear, are the people that we want to be. That mask can be better than our actual selves or worse, depending on the society that we are trying to fit into.
1. Describe the "continuum of roles" one might play in life, according to Goffman. What does it mean to be "sincere" vs. being a "cynic?" Give your own examples of someone on either end of the continuum, then use your example to illustrate how someone might alter their belief in the role they play over time.
One plays different roles for the benefit of others according to Goffman. He also said that when someone plays a role they want the audience to take seriously what is being presented to them regardless if they believe in what is being presented. There are two extremes to the roles we play in life. One is sincere role playing where an individual believes in what they are expressing by their own performance. The other extreme is cynical role playing where the performer has no belief in his own performance and no concern for the beliefs of the audience, but someone who is playing a cynical role isn't always doing it for self-interest but for the benefit of the audience. That what they are performing will benefit them in some way but they are not concerned by how.
A sincere performer could be a preacher who truly believes in their preaching, and believes that it is benefiting the individual and the community for the greater good. An example of a cynical performer is a Politian giving a speech about a current issue that they personally don't have any interest in or care about the audience's interest in the issue, but they are doing it for the benefit of the community. There are exceptions to these roles, for example an exception to cynical role playing is that the performers are forced to be cynical because their audiences will not allow them to be sincere. An example of this exception is the nurse rechecking the monitor for a nervous woman. There is also an example of an exception to sincere role play where the customers telling the cook that the food was great to avoid hurting their feelings.
A performer who may alter the role they are playing over time could be a teacher. They may really be sincere in believing in a lecture that they are giving on a topic that they think will benefit the students. Then another topic that they are lecturing about they may be cynical about it because they don't believe in it and don't care if the students get anything from it they are just doing it because it is required. I believe we are always bouncing from each extreme of the roles in our everyday life. There isn't always going to be things that we are sincere about which will force us to put on a cynical performance to please the audience.
Goffman:
1. When performing a role, the social player may be considered as occupying a position along a continuum from "cynical" to "sincere." The cynical player believes that he is lying. He is aware that he is merely playing a role and projecting something other than his own personal truth. The sincere player, on the other hand, believes wholeheartedly in his role. If he does not believe that it is his true self, then he believes it is a truth which he is trying to achieve. I will draw examples of two such polar players from the modern Batman films. James Gordon is the sincere Sergeant/Commissioner of the Gotham Police Department. Everyone knows that he is a "straight man" working for the renewal of Gotham. He doesn't maintain any false pretenses. He keeps people's secrets, he loves his family, and does his job. There's no other face to his story. A cynic would be Bruce Wayne. The role that Bruce Wayne plays is that of a fun-loving, indulgent, well-meaning billionaire. His true self, however, is Batman--a serious, crime-fighting hero. Of course, not everyone exists as a perfect cynic or perfectly sincere person. Many people exist along the continuum, or change places throughout their life. For example, Officer Ramirez (in the Dark Knight) starts out as on honest cop, but this turns into a façade when she begins accepting bribes to pay her mother's hospital bills.
2. As I have hinted, Goffman really uses the idea of interaction as role-taking. Thus, every interaction is a "performance." Those interacting are playing parts. They are doing this amongst physical context such as props and setting, which are called the "front." The front also consists of things attached to the actor, such as appearance and body language, which are specified as the "personal front." Personal front can then be divided into (a) "appearance" and (b) "manner." Appearance reflects social status and social context. For example, someone wearing a suit is probably at a formal event, and the quality or style of their suit probably says something about their social class. Manner, on the other hand, reveals what role a person expects to play in a situation. Someone who makes eye contact with you probably wants to engage in conversation. Goffman uses more refined examples of how posture can indicate whether you intend to lead or follow in a conversation. We can apply all of these terms to Batman. Whenever he does anything social he is performing. His front is very indicative of his performance. If he is hosting a fundraiser, he will be in his penthouse. If he is fighting crime, he will be in dirty alleys and dark buildings. He uses props such as his armour and Bat-gear, fine cars, and ostentatious displays of wealth (such as buying restaurants and absconding with entire ballet casts). His appearance includes all black armour, a cape, and a mask, as well as a suit and tie. His manner might include raising his voice to indicate he is about to give a speech, not punching a criminal to indicate that it is their turn to speak, or getting up from the floor to indicate he is not done fighting.
3. Dramatic realization is simply the symbolic expression of an activity. It can be convenient, such as with an NFL athlete, whose training and games are broadcast, to rather inconvenient, as with secretaries or researchers who do a lot of independent, behind-the-scenes work. In the case of such persons, effort must be made to communicate their role. A researcher must give a presentation about his work; the secretary probably keeps a tidy desk and professional appearance to make up for the invisibility of financing and scheduling. When the worker must put a large amount of effort into the dramatization (rather than achievement) of their role, we encounter the "dilemma of expression versus action." Someone trying to get funding for a project or filling out applications for jobs might feel they suffer this dilemma. What they want is to be developing their project or working, but instead they are practicing interviews, writing essays, and manipulating their credentials.
4. Performances present an ideal in two ways. First, they tend to represent an ideal type. Second, they tend to represent an ideal toward which the actors are striving. Since the ideals we choose are socially influenced, the performance of them is both a reaffirmation and celebration of society.
The ritual of punishment, to relate back to Durkheim, is a celebration of society. Repressive punishment in particular amends offenses by bringing the community together in honor of the very ideals which were injured. At a public hanging, someone who committed adultery is reviled and killed while the onlookers stand together and build their respect for the ideal of celibacy and loyalty. This performance presents an ideal because many people break the various legal, religious, and unwritten laws regarding sexual intercourse, but only one of them is being hanged. Having sex with only one person is something of a utopian idea, yet it is also an ideal society encourages us to follow.
Blumer:
1. Symbolic Interactionism rests on two concepts: symbols and interpretation. Blumer's big idea here is that the distinction between humanity and the rest of the animal kingdom is that between the events of stimulus and response we insert a process of reflection. Rather than simply reacting to something we sense, we take time to analyze meanings. Take a game of catch. Without the conscious mind engaged, we would naturally respond to an incoming, high-speed object by ducking out of its path. With our minds engaged, however, we can realize that the object is a ball and that we are expected to catch it. All of conscious life is interpreted in this way. To bring it back to Mead, the original author of symbolic interactionism, interpretation is the process carried out by the Me. Symbolic Interaction is so significant because through it we apply subjective meanings to everything. This deviates from functionalism by declaring that the individual is not simply reacting to social stimuli, and does not have purely mathematical actions. In Functionalism, people are only media through which the social is expressed and upon which it acts. With symbolic interactionism, the individual has more power to comprehend and affect the social.
2. Blumer describes 4 central conceptions of symbolic interaction in the context of their methodological implications. They are...
a. People interpret and act on the symbols around them. This includes language and also context. It means that our decisions are affected by everything around us, from a welcome mat to architecture. The implication here is that when researching, we cannot fathom the motives and meanings of someone's actions without knowing what was going on around them. To try to 'objectively' analyze actions is foolish, because actions are defined in a subjective context.
b. Interaction is an interpretive process. I have already explained this. The point is, to research interaction, one must understand the interpretation. It is not enough to know that Bob asked Jillian how her mother was doing and that she responded 'fine.' We need to know what Bob meant by his question, how Jillian interpreted it, and what she meant by her response.
c. Everyone interprets situations in their own way. This means that researchers need to exercise caution not to assume the subject of their research thinks like them.
d. Society is dynamic. Things are always happening, people are always changing and acting, and the networking of all of this into society is likewise an unstable, evolving entity. Here Blumer is making his point that one era's perfect social theories may not apply to the next era, and that we need to adapt and shift with society rather than try to reconcile outdated theories.
Blumer's four conceptions create a micro-sociological theory which gives a lot more importance to context and individual interpretation than any other theorist. It's micro-focus on the individual sets it in stark contrast to macro-scale theories. It is differentiated from other micro theories in that it sets out only one vague theory of symbolic interactionism, but puts a lot of emphasis on the process and application of research.
2. Define the following terms from the reading, and explain how they relate to one another: performance, front, setting, personal front, appearance, manner. Using an example of a "social performer" (any social actor), describe how we might commonly encounter this person in terms of each concept above.
When reading The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, I couldn't help but think about Target and how the roles their employees play relate to the terms presented by Goffman. For Goffman, as individuals take on specific roles, they expect that their observers interpret their actions as honest and genuine. "They are asked to believe that the character they see actually possess the attributes he appears to possess, that the task he performs will have the consequences that are implicitly claimed for it, and that, in general, matters are what they appear to be" (52). A target employee is expected to perform his/her duties in a way that makes customers and management believe that they care about the duties they complete and the customers they help. Like other jobs in customer service, employees are expected to display a positive and helpful attitude, leaving observers to believe that is their true self even if off the clock they are the complete opposite.
The duties of employees refer to their "performance." Performance includes the activity of an individual marked by a continuous presence of observers, which have some influence over the observers. In the example of target, performance can include anything done during an individual's shift because they are constantly surrounded by customers, management and other employees. The parts of an individual's performance that regularly functions to define the situation for those who observe the performance is the "front." This is a standard performance, for a target employee it may stocking shelves or running a cash register. These actions define for the observer that the individual is a target employee who is completing duties of his/her job. Target itself is the setting for this type of performance. "Setting," which is part of "front," includes the background items that supply the scenery for the performance and the stage props for human action that is played out. Setting is an important part of a Target employee's performance because it is a fixed setting. The individual can't perform until he is at his setting, and as soon as he leaves his performance is over. What may also be included in this setting are isles of food shelves that need to be stocked, checkout lanes, and various other items and props that call for action from an individual. Like setting, "personal front" refers to other items of expressive equipment. Personal front includes items intimately identified with the performer and are expected to follow him wherever he goes. When I think of Target, I immediately think of red shirts and khaki pants because that is the uniform required of employees. What also comes to mind are name tags and walkie-talkies, these items are signs that the individual is employed by Target and is capable of assisting us find what we need. Also included in personal front are appearance and manner. "Appearance" refers to the stimuli that tell us about the performer's status and temporary ritual state. Seeing an individual in the Target uniform, equipped with a nametag and walkie-talkie, tells us he is working and available to help. "Manner" then refers to the stimuli that warn us of the interaction role the performer is expected to play in an upcoming situation. An employee with an aggressive manner gives off the impression to the customer that he will be somewhat confrontational and be resistant to their requests. An employee with a passive manner then gives off the impression that he will be much more understanding and accepts their requests. Thus, we can see how the Target employee becomes a social actor and we encounter many other social actors in our daily lives, including teachers, doctors, bus drivers and other students.
Symbolic-Interactionism as described by Blumer "refers to the peculiar and distinctive character of interaction as it takes place between human beings." More specifically the theory looks at the meaning that an individual has placed upon an action. So instead of simply reacting to an action they base their reaction on the meaning they have place upon that action. An example of this would be the burning of the U.S. flag. The action of burning the national flag to some individuals can be seen as okay form of social protest whereas other individuals may see that act as a desecration of a national object and view it as an unacceptable form of protest. All the individuals see the national flag as the same symbol but each person attaches a different meaning to the action of burning it in regards to protest. According to the symbolic-interactionism theory the meaning that individuals put towards an action come straight out of the previous experiences and social interactions that person has had in the society. So going back to the national flag example each person's meaning of the act of burning the flag will be based upon historical social interactions they have shared in society through many outlets such as family, school, and/or church.
There are four central conceptions of symbolic-interactionism. The first one is "people, individually and collectively, are prepared to act on the basis of the meanings of the objects that comprise their world". This means that people are going to use their own meanings of symbols and interactions to interpret objects in their society. They are going to do this process inherently as according to the theory individual's use their own past interaction to guide their future definitions. The second conception is "the association of people is necessarily in the form of a process in which they are making indications to one another and interpreting each other's indications. In other words for a person to attach meanings to symbols and interactions the individual needs to associate and interact with other people who they are able to make indication and interpretation through. The third conception is "social acts, whether individual or collective, are constructed through a process in which the actors note, interpret, and assess the situations confronting them". This refers to the actual process the individual goes through when confronted with an act. They will process what had previously learned about that interaction from the second conception and then determine how they will want to react when confronted again by the same action or possibly new action which the individual has never experienced. The fourth conception is "the complex interlinkages of acts that compromise organizations, institutions, division of labor, and networks of interdependency are moving and not static affairs. This simply means that the interpretations of acts between individuals in a society are constantly changing and rarely remain forever the same meaning. The burning of the national flag could easily be seen years from now as a very socially acceptable form of protest by everyone or it could possibly be seen the opposite. It all depends upon how individuals will interpret that action and then pass on that interpretation to others.
Micro-Sociology II Reading Questions:
"The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life" - Erving Goffman
1. Describe the "continuum of roles" one might play in life, according to Goffman. What does it mean to be "sincere" vs. being a "cynic?" Give your own examples of someone on either end of the continuum, then use your example to illustrate how someone might alter their belief in the role they play over time.
2. Define the following terms from the reading, and explain how they relate to one another: performance, front, setting, personal front, appearance, manner. Using an example of a "social performer" (any social actor), describe how we might commonly encounter this person in terms of each concept above.
3. What is "dramatic realization," and how is it connected to the "dilemma of expression versus action" (58)?
4. What does Goffman mean that performances tend to present "an idealized view of the situation?" (58). Use examples from Durkheim on the rituals of punishment or religion to illustrate this concept.
"Symbolic Interactionism" - Herbert Blumer
1. Define "symbolic-interactionism," as it is outlined by Blumer. How does this theoretical perspective challenge the "functionalism" of theorists like Durkheim/Parsons?
2. Explain the "four central conceptions" of symbolic-interactionism. Define each with reference to the text, but work to explain each in your own words. How do they fit together to form a micro-sociological perspective that is distinct from the other theorists we've studied?
1. What are some of the ambiguities of "understanding of the other self"? How do you think Schutz' observations and thoughts on "understanding of the other self" leads to his theory of the phenomenological descriptions of the formal structures of the social world?
As specified by Schutz, some of the ambiguities of "understanding of the other self" refers to a subjective experience in which we put ourselves in the place of the actor (other person) and to identify our lived experience with theirs. If we have already have a genuine understanding of the other person as the observer, we would have a better comprehension of the meanings the "actor" is trying to imply. Schutz uses Weber's model example of the "woodcutter's mind". With this model Schutz thought that without communications or comprehensions we observe the woodcutter's actions and with these actions we interpret them as signs, those signs subject our own perceptions to the interpretation of what we know of a human being cutting wood. " We place ourselves in the woodcutters mind and project that person's goal and where his train of thinking is going through his own perception. But we know with certainty that the other person's subjective experience of his own actions is in principle different from our own imagined picture of what we would do in the same situation (pg. 33)." What he is basically trying to point out is the "intended meaning of an action is always in principle subjective and accessible only to the actor (pg. 33)." The person who observes the woodcutter would have a lot of assumptions running through their mind about the woodcutter while cutting woods. They would probably assume that maybe it's his job? possibly a hobby of his? or maybe he physically exercising? It's the subject's actions that give off signs to the observer in which the signs are interpreted into ones to create their own perception that reaches to a conclusion.
2. Are there similarities between Schutz' phenomenology and Weber's verstehen? Elaborate please.
From my understanding I think there are similarities between verstehen and phenomenology because verstehen refers to understanding the meaning and actions from the actors point of view meaning by entering into the shoes of the other and adopting and organizing their own understanding of it and giving it meaning in which it is seen more as a subject. Verstehen is a deeper understanding of meanings. It is used to analyze important element of culture and society. Therefore we can understand human action by penetrating to the subjective meanings that actors attach to their own behavior and to the behaviors of others. Phenomenology is seen more as an object because it appears as an act of consciousness in which sees things as objects, it is an act as intentional consciousness. Phenomenology tends to recognize the role of description. I think that the similarities they both may have are the mental consciousness that they develop in order to be in the other person's shoes. Overall a deeper understanding of things. Even though I see that the subjects and objects are taken in different approaches'.
1. What are some of the ambiguities of "understanding of the other self"? How do you think Schutz' observations and thoughts on "understanding of the other self" leads to his theory of the phenomenological descriptions of the formal structures of the social world?
Some ambiguities of "understanding of the other self" as specified by Schutz are subjective experiences of the person trying to understand the other, the interpretation of signs by the other person, the understanding of the sign and the significance of the fact that the sign is being used in the context that it is being applied in. To understand the other person, the observer can apply his own experience and interpret signs. Schutz uses Weber's model of the woodcutter as an example to demonstrate how the interpreter interprets woodcutting through using his own perception. We can actually apply our own experience of woodcutting to put ourselves in the place of the woodcutter. Schutz is saying that this way of understanding the other is uncertain and says that the "intended meaning of an action is always in principles subjective and accessible only to the actor" (33) meaning that the significance of an act from someone is personal to them and only they know the reasons for acting a certain way. Schutz goes to say that the observer can reach a conclusion about his subject only if he knows about his past or knows why the other is acting a certain way. For example, why is the subject cutting wood? Maybe it is his job, or maybe it is a hobby. The interpreter puts himself in the place of the other and imagines himself being the other. Through his theory of phenomenology, I believe Schutz is saying that understanding of the other self is based on subjective and objective knowledge of the other through communication and interaction.
2. B&L stresses the importance of "language" for the creation of social meaning and social order. Why is language so important?
According to Berger and Luckmann, language provides the rationality behind the institutionalized world. Language is an instrument of knowledge that is institutionalized because it has been passed down from past generations and it is a custom of society. Language was a 'habitualized' thing until it became a social norm and became an institution of knowledge about how things function and should function in society. It was created by humans and will still exist after humanity ceases to exist. Language in this case is a product of humanity and becomes a product of reality after it has come to be applied by many. If one does not speak a language, he is seen as deviant, ignorant, or mentally diseased. He is not considered part of reality.
Schutz, Berger and Luckmann, were micro-sociologists. They found importance in social interactions between humans, meanings, and lived experiences. These sociologists approached sociology in a very Weberian way. They saw the importance of the individual and how he can act on society.
At the beginning of The Phenomenology of the Social World, Schutz outlines a few ambiguities for understanding another person: intentional acts, one's subjective experience, motivation-contexts, and understanding signs. Shutz looked from the individual to the bigger social world when he created his phenomenology. By looking at how individuals understand others' social actions, it is a way to study our social world. Schutz draws from Weber's theories. The two theorists emphasized understanding and context of situations, because those two things can change the whole situation. Schutz gives the example of a wood cutter. By simply observing the wood cutter, a person can assume that he is "cutting wood." However "why" he is cutting wood is not as obvious. Schutz posits two ways of interpreting this action without actually talking with the wood cutter, by putting yourself in the other person's shoes or by drawing from personal experience. Verstehen tells the person to do the same thing. Both theories look at the meaning as well as the individual's experience . Schutz goes further from just understanding motives and separates subjective and objective meanings in his example of the wood cutter.
Berger and Luckmann also believed that the individual experience and interaction was important in forming our society. In the reading they talk about institutions and how they came to be. Berger and Luckmann wrote that our realties are socially constructed. Therefore different realities exist depending on where and how one is socialized. Warring states is an example of multiple realities. In war, there are two sides, each who think they are in the right. Depending on where you live, your reality is different. One example of this is the "war on terrorism." The September 11th attacks on the United States was a devastating event to American citizens. For Al Qaeda, it was a victory. Here, good and evil is blurred. Depending on which side you were on, September 11th had a different meaning to you. The realities of the people involved were also different. Neither side is "wrong" in how they viewed their position because of their histories. The United State's reality is that terrorists are evil and should be eliminated before they commit more wrong doings. For Al Qaeda, they are preserving and spreading the rule of Islam. There are even more realities beyond the scope of these two actors in this place and time. Given this model, Schutz phenomenology proves to be important in analyzing each society to understand the motives and relationships that have led to each social world.
Berger and Luckmann believed language was important because it is a tool for socialization and habitualization. It facilitates the interaction of people in a way that both people understand and can comprehend. Language makes it easier to pass down traditions and beliefs to new generations, which makes it easier to institutionalize things. Schutz also believed that language was important in his work. Language is an important sign however it can also be interpreted in a lot of ways so, knowing a person personally makes it easier to understand the language of that other person. All forms of communication are open to interpretation especially when seeking to fully understand the social world.
Berger and Luckmann write about "different spheres of reality" or "multiple realities", what do B&L mean by those terms? Can you think of examples from your experience for "multiple realities" or "different spheres of reality"?
-I think what B&L mean by "multiple realities" is the fact that society can be understood by what knowledge is objective and what is subjective. Basically, we live our lives based on what "everyone already knows", and what seems to be a natural reality even though they theorize that society and it's institutionalizations are socially constructed. It's as if the way we live our lives in society is 'common sense', but where does it come from? B&L theorize that when we attempt to change an existing way of life, we can. When a new generation of children come along, what they have learned from their predecessors becomes a sort of fixed 'thing' and is reinforced by generations to come. These foundations on ways of living seem natural, like it's how is always been. The truth is, life is socially created and we can constantly change existing ways of life. This is when a more subjective reality comes into play, but changing a way of life i.e. norms, values, morals that are collectively accepted would be difficult. This is because everyone in society have culturally accepted ways of living and if you dare go against them you might be shunned away from everyone else. Perhaps looking at the world from the reality that all of society is socially created, not just accepting it as 'natural' can be a way to spark social change. A small scale example I might use to illustrate this concept might be how more and more teenage girls are having children before they are married. It seems that especially in our society, it just seems like the 'right' way to live your life by getting married, securing a home, and then having children. However, more and more girls are unmarried teenage mothers in this day in age. Many times, the children of these teenage mothers have children young and before marriage as well. Many still look at this as 'wrong' based on religious/cultural beliefs, but it is becoming more accepted in society. This example would describe how one reality that seemed to be just how you were supposed to live is challenged by different realities. Then these existing realities become strengthened or reinforced by the way they saw generations before living their lives.
B&L stresses the importance of "language" for the creation of social meaning and social order. Why is language so important?
-Language is so important because it is passed down from generation to generation. It is an objective 'thing' that already exists and it is strengthened through transmission from parents to children. Language will always exist, whether one likes it or not. It was already in existence when you were born, and it will continue to exist after everyone dies. Most importantly, language is a social creation, a human product. This creates a special relationship, a dialectical one, between the producer and his product. Language can be compared to a socially created institution, which helps society function harmoniously. It is used to help one understand society and how it works externally as well as internally. Language is the way we transmit knowledge, which is what becomes 'what everyone knows', so we all understand what is institutionally appropriate in society.
What are some of the ambiguities of "understanding of the other self"? How do you think Schutz' observations and thoughts on "understanding of the other self" leads to his theory of the phenomenological descriptions of the formal structures of the social world?
Are there similarities between Schutz' phenomenology and Weber's verstehen? Elaborate please.
Berger and Luckmann writes about "different spheres of reality" or "multiple realities", what do B&L mean by those terms? Can you think of examples from your experience for "multiple realities" or "different spheres of reality"?
B&L stresses the importance of "language" for the creation of social meaning and social order. Why is language so important?
"The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception" - Horkheimer & Adorno
2. Describe what the "culture industry" is, according to H & A. Through what primary technologies is mass culture produced? Discuss the authors' example of the technological advance from telephone to radio. What are they saying about how this transformation changes the position of the consumer? (p. 386). Think about the title of this article-- "Enlightenment as Mass Deception." What happened to the "freedoms" of the Enlightenment in the mass culture industry of advanced capitalism, according to H & A? In other words, are we really "free" in the culture industry, or what kind of freedoms do we really have? Do you agree with this theory?
The influence of pop culture is undeniable. Attempting to stray from forms of mass media, therefore, proves to be a difficult task. Pop culture appears nothing more than a factory producing meagre culture goods in order to reduce the masses to a state of emotionlessness and indifference. And by means of film, television, music, and magazines the people at large are brained washed by their consumption of such simple pleasures, resulting in a more lethargic and easy to shape, mould and manage, general public. While members of society desperately seek avenues to stand out as individuals, they are continually led into the machine that the Culture Industry, which is theorized in depth by Adorno and Horkheimer. It is through this industry that a culture is produced and force-fed to a population and begins the process of manipulating their interests. As culture becomes standardized, people become passive and contented by continually consuming mass media. Adorno drives this point home when he says, "freedom to choose an ideology-since ideology always reflects economic coercion-everywhere proves to be freedom to choose what is always the same" (pg. 389) With the ever-growing advertising industry, this statement is becoming harder to deny. As members of society continues to seek in individuality, Adorno emphasizes the growing blurring between what is artificial and what is real. People are constantly being convinced that if they invest in a certain product, that they will achieve power, control, distinction, or some other grand prize that will boost them above others. This is witnessed today in celebrity culture, with that elite class of people being the ideal. The path to this ideal, unfortunately, is no more unique for one person than the next. the producers with the culture industry simply employ the pleasure-seeker as another customer and treat him like the rest. Ultimately, the consumer of the Culture Industry is doomed for a continually degenerating sense of individualism."Technology acquires power over society is the power of those whose economic hold over society is the greatest.The step from the telephone to the radio has clearly distinguished the roles" (pg.386), in this age we are losing our subjectivity and we are all the time judged by the market value exchanged system which makes different between appearance and reality. Enlightenment brought the ideology of utility of art and encouraged mass production which eventually turned out to be a mass deception. I don't think that we are really "free" when the mass media shapes and influences our reality. It's not easy to make rational decisions of their own, when the mass media takes over consumers powers of imagination. I do agree with this theory because it only makes sense. Capitalist and Culture Industry has enormous control over society and changed the mind thinking of many consumers. They produce what is ideal but not reality. And with that being said, consumers tend to believe such illusion and easily deceived in believing such deception. It exist in our society. It had changed many traditions over the past years and pretty much developed and illusionary tradition and reality of their own.
First Mannheim distinguishes two types of ideology, which are particular and total. Particular has more psychological character and mostly realized through ideas of certain people that implies skepticism toward those ideas. And total ideology is the one that characterize the mode of thought of an epoch. Then Mannheim introduces the term "utopia", which we usually understand as anything that transcends reality, e.g. unrealistic is utopian. Mannheim argues opposite. He introduces the difference by using two terms: ideology and utopia that are ideas that transcend reality. The difference between the two terms is a very difficult issue, but since some ideas that transcend reality today may become reality of tomorrow, those are close to be called ideologies. Mannheim suggests that if ideas "passed over into conduct, tend to shatter either partially or wholly, the order of things prevailing at the time", than those ideas would be called utopian. Ideologies can be incongruent with a given social order, but if passed into conduct, they would organically integrate into a world-view of a given time. Also, Mannheim suggests that there are unrealistic ideas that are unrealistic for only a given prevailing social order, and there are those that are unrealistic for any social order.
But even thought this distinction may seem obvious, Mannheim argues that there are differences in social situations that make later distinction to be blurred again. He suggests that from a perspective of people that at a given time are of different social circumstances, the meaning of "real" could be different. So, for people who represent prevailing social and intellectual order any idea that has to do with change is utopian, which is different for from people that are driven by opposition to a prevailing social order. For an opposition the same idea is more an ideology than utopia.
As was mentioned earlier, one of the distinction of utopia and ideology is utopian strives to burst the bonds of an existing order. But it turns out that this distinction is not perfect and the terms utopia and ideology are more of continuous rather than dichotic. Describing so called ascending bourgeoisie Mannheim finds a utopian idea with elements of ideology in the idea of freedom. In order to achieve Freedom in the setting of guild and class order, this idea had to burst asunder the bonds of the static order, which would make this idea to be a utopian one. As we know the change in accordance with the idea of freedom took place and turned out not to be a utopian after all. In this case Mannheim suggests that to realize an idea to be ideological or utopian is a prerogative of a social stratum that comes later after a change of an existing order.
After this argument Mannheim suggested that from point of view of later social stratum, ideas that only were distortions of a past social order would be considered ideological, versus those ideas that "were adequately realized in the succeeding social order would be considered relative utopias.
For Mannheim, there are two "distinct and separable meanings" of ideology. The first is the particular conception of ideology. The particular conception of ideology plays out on a more personal scale. Mannheim defines it as "[denoting] that we are skeptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponents" (336). In a sense, Mannheim describes the act of pointing out this conception of ideology much as one who discovers a liar; we recognize the "true" nature of the situation, whereas our opponent "disguises the real nature of situation" in order to account more fully for his or her interests. The second definition is the "total conception" of ideology. In this "total" conception of ideology, Mannheim is referring to the "ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social group, e.g. of a class." In this sense, it refers somewhat to Marx's idea of ruling class, ruling ideas. The first conception of ideology is in some way a function of psychology, whereas the second, "total," conception is a function of noology, or a way of knowing. What is meant though by this term, ideology? Mannheim says that knowledge is distorted and ideological when it fails to take account of the new realities applying to a situation, and when it attempts to conceal them by thinking of them in categories which are inappropriate" (340). The term "utopia" is in itself very similar because it too is incongruous with reality. However, Mannheim gives a very precise definition by saying, "Only those orientations transcending reality will be referred to by us as utopian which, when they pass over into conduct, tend to shatter either partially or wholly, the order of things prevailing at the time" (341). We see first that both idea, ideology and utopia, are seen as "transcending reality," but what does this mean? They are considered "transcendent" or "unreal" because "their contents can never be realized in the societies in which they exist, and because one could not live and act according to them within the limits of the existing social order" (342). There are differences, again, between these thoughts. Ideologies are transcendent ideas which never succeed in the realization of their content. As an example, Mannheim gives the idea of Christian brotherly love, to which he says, "the individual... is always compelled to fall short of his own nobler motives" (342). Utopias also "transcend reality" because of their orientation to elements which reality does not contain. However, utopias break from ideology, and as described by Mannheim "they are not ideologies in the measure and in so far as they succeed through counteractivity in transforming the existing historical reality into one more in accord with their own conceptions" (343). Therefore, a position becomes truly utopian when its realization would change the very "reality" at that historical moment. This differs from a merely ideological position in the measure that ideologies can never be realized fully and have a sort of conservative effect. For Mannheim, that which makes a utopia truly distinct from an ideology depends on historico-social reality and the groups therein. Mannheim says that, "the representatives of a given order will label as utopian all conceptions of existence which from their point of view can in principle never be realized" (343). This is an important distinction because their rejection of the utopian functions to serve their interest in maintaining the status quo, in which they already hold a certain position. The representatives of a given order discount all utopias as not only impossible to realize in the given social order but also in every social order, in order to suppress all utopias as impossible ideas. However in the same way that these representatives have a "utopia-blindness," there is an equal blindness to the existing order in those too emphasizing utopia and revolution, or anarchists who promote a false authoritarian vs. libertarian dichotomy. The distinction between ideology and utopia is further blurred by the fact that utopian ideals can also contain ideological elements. This is seen in Mannheim's example of bourgeois freedom. In this example, the bourgeoisie's ideal of freedom was a truly utopian ideal, because it sought to destroy the bonds of the guild system and create a new social order. However, this bourgeois class also made concessions to "equality," which was contradictory to their ideals of freedom and set up goals in opposition to the truly utopian notion of freedom, so the idea of equality was in this sense the ideological element which is a part of their truly utopian goals.
